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CHAPTER 1 
 
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Transparency is increasingly a more topical, broadly relevant, but also more 
under-researched enterprise. The recent financial crises and corporate scandals 
in Asia, Europe, and America have highlighted the welfare consequences of 
corporate transparency, and linked this relatively narrow problem to the broader 
context of transparency in governance (Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 1999). 
Transparency, responsible corporate disclosure, and effective corporate 
governance, have thus given rise to concern and public debate in the UK and on 
the international scene. Greater transparency is argued to improve the economy 
through better resource allocation, enhanced efficiency, and increased growth 
prospects. In recent years, qualitative information and narrative statements have 
assumed increasing importance in financial disclosure (Rutherford, 2003). This 
development can be seen from a technical perspective as a response to 
increasing awareness that traditional systems of accounting measurement and 
disclosure cannot, by themselves, provide a sufficiently rich data set to satisfy 
stakeholders’ needs for information about, for example, board and management 
processes, ownership structure, corporate strategy, business risk and social 
performance.  It can also be viewed from a wider perspective as a ‘political’ 
response to decreasing public confidence in the accounting numbers that are 
the output of traditional systems (Labelle, 2002).  
The King Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa II (2001) defines 
transparency as the ease with which an outsider is able to make meaningful 
analysis of a company’s actions, its economic fundamentals and the non-
financial aspects pertinent to that business. It states that transparency is a 
measure of how good management is at making necessary information available 
in a candid, accurate, and timely manner. Corporate disclosure thus becomes 
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the principal means by which companies become transparent. Disclosure has 
long been recognised as the essence of corporate accountability. In the absence 
of full, timely, and accurate disclosure, market participants will have difficulty 
comparing the financial performance of different firms and may make investment 
decisions based on inferences about the information that is not provided.  
Emerging empirical research suggests that where financial liberalisation takes 
place in an environment where transparency is absent, financial crisis is more 
likely (Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 1999). Thus, the trend towards greater 
transparency has been given substantially greater impetus by the succession of 
corporate scandals in the United States and Europe, and the wave of financial 
crises in Russia, Asia, and Brazil.   
 
Zimbabwe has experienced an unprecedented financial crisis in recent months, 
largely because of the abuse of power by dominant corporate officials, 
regulatory arbitraging, speculative trading by financial institutions, and poor risk 
management (Chikura, 2004). These practices have been argued to reflect poor 
accounting and disclosure standards, combined with weak board and 
management oversight. Further, they are symptomatic of a lack of effective 
corporate governance and transparency in Zimbabwe’s financial markets and 
individual companies. However, there have been concerted efforts to enhance 
corporate governance in recent years in Zimbabwe, partly encouraged by 
international social and economic developments (Tsumba, 2001). The Institute 
of Directors of Zimbabwe (IODZ) has spearheaded the campaign to adopt 
principles popularised in the Combined Code of the UK, and the King Report of 
South Africa. The IODZ is dedicated to improving the expertise, status and 
professionalism of managers and directors of Zimbabwean companies through 
training and education. It also seeks to curb fraud and corruption. IODZ has set 
up a special purpose committee that prepares and disseminates guidelines on 
corporate governance, while certain prominent members of the institute, such as 
Anglo American, and Delta Corporation, have developed their own in-house 
corporate governance manuals. The current governor of the Reserve Bank of 
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Zimbabwe undertook in his maiden Monetary Policy statement to foster 
corporate governance as a vehicle for financial and economic development in 
Zimbabwe (Gono, 2003).  
 
Zimbabwe has been chosen as the focus of this study for several reasons. First, 
despite boasting the second largest stock exchange in Africa, after South Africa, 
very little is known about the Zimbabwean business environment. As a result, 
the corporate reporting practices in Zimbabwe remain relatively less well 
understood. Second, Zimbabwe is one of a few emerging economies to adopt 
the standards of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) as 
national accounting standards, therefore it is expected that the reporting 
practices of Zimbabwean companies are internationally comparable. Third, 
corporate transparency is of particular importance to Zimbabwe because the 
prevailing economic and political conditions in the country present ethical 
dilemmas for company directors.  
 
Zimbabwe faces several challenges to good corporate governance practice, 
particularly corporate transparency (Magaisa, 2004a). The global coalition 
against corruption, Transparency International, rates Zimbabwe one of the most 
corrupt countries in the world. In Zimbabwe, as in most African countries, 
corruption permeates both the public and private sectors, thus the monitoring 
position and independence of auditors and non-executive directors, for example, 
becomes compromised. Lack of transparency increases the scope for corruption 
by creating information asymmetries between regulators and regulated entities, 
and the corruption vitiates public regulation as a means of mitigating the 
information failures (UNECA, 2002). It therefore becomes very difficult, but ever 
more important, to promote transparency and good governance in such an 
environment (Magaisa, 2004a). The second challenge is presented by the legal 
and judicial systems.  Many authors argue that the raison d’etre of corporate 
governance, in any country, is to protect the interests of shareholders, and the 
interests of other investors through the contractual relations with the company.  
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However, the recent agrarian reforms through farm invasions have generally 
been construed as a disregard of property rights laws by the Zimbabwean 
government (for example; Bloch, 2004; Robertson, 2003; Magaisa, 2004; 
OECD, 2004). It may be argued that this portrays a judicial system that is 
tolerant of crime offenders, lacks monitoring and enforcement, therefore does 
not promote accountability. From a corporate perspective therefore, the legal 
system is seen as being weak in enforcing rules and regulations, thus 
shareholder and creditor rights are compromised. The protection of investor 
rights is particularly important in an economy where there is a risk that a small 
group of people endowed with political and economic power may abuse such 
power if left unchecked (Vishwanath and Kaufman, 1999). Finally, the political 
instability in Zimbabwe has meant that regulation and enforcement is selective. 
Business leaders are expected to tow the political line if they are to succeed 
(Bloch, 2004a). Consequently, any business practices or information that may 
be construed as promoting the cause of the opposition political party is withheld, 
further compromising corporate transparency. 
 
1.2 Objectives  
The main objective of this study is to assess the transparency of Zimbabwean 
businesses. The second objective is to explain the variability in the transparency 
of the sample companies in terms of four corporate governance, and three 
company-specific attributes. Transparency is conceptualised in this study as the 
disclosure of corporate information on three broad categories; ownership 
structure and investor rights, financial information, and board and management 
structure and process, using the annual report as the information dissemination 
medium.  
 
1.3 Potential Contributions  
 
There has been extensive research into the transparency practices at both firm 
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and country levels. However, most of this research has been mainly focused on 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and other developed economies 1. 
Although considerable research has been undertaken in emerging markets in 
recent years, the focus has been on Asian economies, thus findings of these 
studies may not be applicable to African economies due to different cultural and 
political environments. Examining the transparency of Zimbabwean businesses 
will provide valuable contribution to a debate that is becoming increasingly 
global.  This research is expected to have many other potential benefits. First, 
the results will be of interest to corporate regulators such as the Government, 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. For 
example, results showing that Zimbabwean businesses have low levels of 
transparency2 may lead to tighter regulation. Regulation aimed at making 
businesses more transparent will have benefits to ordinary investors who rely on 
company management’s corporate governance and financial disclosures and 
may aid the development of the economy as a whole. Second, the audit 
profession may be interested in the research results because evidence that 
businesses are not transparent may suggest that auditors need to be more 
vigilant. Third, the findings may have implications for company management 
who seek to attract external investment. Finally, although Zimbabwe boasts the 
second largest, and second oldest stock exchange in Africa (after South Africa), 
very little academic research has been done on it3, thus this research will enrich 
the literature on the corporate reporting practices and transparency levels of 
African economies, and add to the body of knowledge. 
 
1.4 Summary of Results 
 
In respect to the first objective, results lead to the conclusion that Zimbabwean 
publicly listed companies have low levels of transparency. The results provide 
support for the argument that companies in emerging economies are opaque.  
                                                     
1 For example, Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993; Schadewitz, 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Lang and Lundholm, 1996) 
2 As shown by Owusu-Ansah in his 1998 case study on the adequacy of corporate mandatory disclosure practices in Zimbabwe 
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Although quite low, the mean score of 52% is comparable to the transparency 
scores of other emerging economies (for example; Malaysia, India, Brazil, 
Poland, South Africa, and the Czech Republic). In order to fulfil the second 
objective, hypotheses are developed in Chapter 3 and results of the tests 
presented in Chapter 5. Overall, the results indicate that the variability in the 
transparency scores can best be explained in terms of a company’s ownership 
structure and the number of non-executive directors on the audit committee. Of 
these predictor variables, audit committee composition appears the most critical 
explanatory variable. These results are consistent with agency theory and 
comparable to studies by Chau and Gray (2002) for Hong Kong and Singapore, 
Pham et al (2004) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) for Malaysia, and Williams 
(2003) in Singapore. 
1.5 Project Overview 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives a 
brief overview of the Zimbabwean economic and legal environment, with a 
particular emphasis on the accounting and disclosure regulatory framework. 
This is followed by chapter 3, in which the hypotheses of the study are 
developed, based on established theory and prior studies. The chapter reviews 
relevant literature with a view to identify the gaps to be filled by this study, and 
the theories and themes used in extant disclosure literature to enable the 
development of testable hypotheses. Seven hypotheses are developed. These 
hypotheses seek to establish the strength and direction of relationships between 
certain variables and the transparency of the sample companies. These 
variables are split into corporate governance variables, and company-specific 
attributes. The corporate governance variables are ownership concentration, 
audit committee composition, cross-directorships, and foreign ownership, while 
company-specific characteristics are company size, profitability, and leverage. 
Chapter 4 outlines the research methods and methodology used in the study. 
                                                                                                                                                            
3 The only published studies on this market known to the present researcher is that of price-earnings ratio research by Oppong (1993), and mandatory 
disclosure by Owusu-Ansah (1998), 
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The chapter begins by describing the data used in the study, and the methods 
by which the data was collected. Next, an explanation is given on how 
transparency is measured in this study, and finally, an explanation of, and 
justification for, the statistical techniques employed for hypothesis testing is 
given. In chapter 5, the findings, analysis, and discussion of the results of the 
statistical analyses are presented. First, a descriptive analysis of the data is 
made in order to establish measures of central tendency and dispersion. 
Second, bivariate analyses are performed to establish the strength of 
relationships among the variables. An Ordinary Least Squares regression model 
is then applied to the data to establish the predictive power of selected variables 
on transparency and detailed analysis of results presented. 
The concluding chapter provides conclusions to be drawn from this study, as 
well as outlining its limitations. An attempt is made to outline the policy 
implications for Zimbabwean businesses from the conclusions drawn.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE ZIMBABWEAN BUSINESS OPERATING ENVIRONMENT  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to put the study into context by giving a brief overview of the 
legal and economic operating environment for Zimbabwean business, with 
particular emphasis on the accounting and disclosure regulatory framework. 
Section 2.3 outlines the economic framework, while section 2.4 analyses the 
Zimbabwe regulatory framework. This section is subdivided into the three 
subsections of shareholders’ rights, corporate disclosure regulation, and board 
composition and ownership structure. 
 
2.2 Political Origin 
 
Among the multitude of potential causes of transparency level differences, 
perhaps the initial cause is an organisation’s country of origin (Ang and Ciccone, 
2000). Certain pressures originating from the governance structures may induce 
an organisation to disclose information, and these pressures can come from the 
legal, economic, and accounting environments. The former British colony of 
Southern Rhodesia became the independent Republic of Zimbabwe on 18th 
April 1980 after a prolonged war of liberation. Zimbabwe, which is twice the size 
of the United Kingdom in square miles, is situated in the south of the African 
continent. It is a completely landlocked country, bounded on the north by 
Zambia, east by Mozambique, south by South Africa, and west by Botswana.  
 
2.3 Economic Framework 
 
Zimbabwe‘s economy has traditionally been broadly based and highly diverse. 
In 2002, industry accounted for twenty-five percent of GDP, agriculture sixteen 
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percent, and the service sector the remaining fifty-nine percent (OECD, 2004). 
Despite the extensive diversification of the economy and agriculture’s relatively 
small contribution to GDP, the latter remains the cornerstone of the economy. 
Much of the industrial development has occurred in response to the 
requirements of the agricultural and mining industries, in terms of both input 
supply and processing of output (Price Waterhouse, 1995). In addition, out of 
those employed in 1999, sixty percent of the Zimbabwean workforce were 
working in agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Substantial road, rail, and 
telecommunications networks support the Zimbabwean infrastructure. Mining, 
primarily gold, is also a major activity. Zimbabwe boasts the second largest 
bourse in Africa (after the Johannesburg Stock Exchange) with well-developed 
banking and financial service sectors and possesses one of the best-educated 
work forces on the African continent. 
 
While Zimbabwe has long ranked as one of Africa’s most industrially diversified 
economies, this position has eroded considerably. Its macroeconomic 
environment has deteriorated sharply over the six years to 2003. At the close of 
the year, interest rates surged to 900% and inflation was pegged at more than 
600%.The high and growing inflation contributed to a rapid depreciation of the 
exchange rate. The “real” exchange rate was set at about Z$8 000 to the US 
dollar in the parallel market. Although many public companies, especially in the 
finance industry, reported huge profits in the 2003 financial year, most small 
companies collapsed. There appears to be general consensus among economic 
analysts that the structural adjustment policies of the 1990s, combined with lack 
of support for the agrarian reforms of 2000, greatly contributed to putting the 
economy on a steep path of decline (OECD, 2004). The decline has been 
exacerbated by the resultant brain drain as Zimbabwe’s young professionals 
emigrate en masse. In 2003, per capita GDP is estimated to have declined by 
nearly 14%.  
 
The current economic crisis in Zimbabwe presents challenges to corporate 
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governance in general, and transparency in particular. For example, economic 
analysts agree that the recent turmoil in the banking sector was due to a 
“complete disregard of all principles of corporate governance” by the directors of 
these institutions (Bloch, 2004b). In other instances, directors and senior 
management of financial institutions are accused of investing depositors’ funds 
in speculative and unacceptably high-risk foreign currency investments. One 
economist blames the financial crises of 2003/2004 on “an intentionally myopic 
oblivion to corruption” in the country (Bloch, 2004b). However, the June 2004 
Government Monetary Statement and Fiscal Policy Review indicates positive 
developments in corporate governance and other areas, for example, tax policy, 
public finance management, and financial sector guidelines.  
2.4 Regulatory Framework 
The legal environment holds a foremost position in corporate governance. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that legal protection is essential if outside 
investors are to provide financing to corporations. Important functions of the 
legal system include holding managers to their duty of loyalty to shareholders, 
providing voting privileges for important corporate matters, preventing 
management self-dealing, and protecting creditors.  
The legal system governing business enterprises in Zimbabwe originated from 
that which was operating in the Cape Province of South Africa in 1891; which 
was in itself based on Roman-Dutch law, borrowing from English Common Law 
where necessary (Owusu-Ansah, 1998a). Consequently, the present law in 
Zimbabwe consists much of English commercial, company, and insolvency laws. 
In many cases, the persuasive authority of English and South African judicial 
precedents has strengthened the legislative framework. Two acts substantively 
govern corporate activity in Zimbabwe, the Companies Act 1952 (Chapter 24:03) 
and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Act (Chapter 24:18). The Companies Act 
regulates the pre-incorporation, incorporation, operations and duties of a 
company and its directors, while the Stock Exchange Act provides the legal 
basis for the establishment of the Exchange and governs its operation. The 
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Companies Act also deals with the rights and obligations of directors and 
shareholders. 
 
2.4.1 Shareholders’ Rights 
The primary rights of a shareholder are the right to a dividend when declared 
and the right to vote in company meetings. However, there are two types of 
shareholders in Zimbabwe: owners of preference shares and owners of ordinary 
shares (Nkala and Nyapadi, 1995). Ordinary shares grant the owner the right to 
vote at shareholders assemblies while preference shares give the holder the 
right to a fixed dividend but without the right to vote. In practice, however, 
preference shares are rare. The memorandum and the articles of association 
may authorise revisions of the rights attached to any class of shares, subject to 
the consent of their holders. However, section 91 of the Companies Act protects 
the rights of dissenting shareholders. It grants holders of fifteen percent of 
preference shares who do not consent to or vote in favour of the revision, the 
right to apply to the court to have the variation cancelled. The variation in rights 
is not effective until the court has ruled. Shareholders have several means of 
redress in case their rights have been violated. A shareholder who is not 
satisfied that the board of directors or the management is working towards the 
best interest of the company may apply to the registrar of companies to request 
a board of inquiry.  Alternatively, if there are at least a hundred dissatisfied 
shareholders, or if the dissenting party represent at least five percent of the 
issued share capital of the company, they may apply directly to the Minister of 
Justice for such an inquiry. An aggrieved shareholder may also approach the 
court directly if his statutory rights are allegedly violated or, subject to a provision 
in the articles of association, make use of the arbitration courts.  
In general, there are no material restrictions on the ability of an investor to 
launch a hostile take over bid, except for foreign investors. There is no written 
takeover code in Zimbabwe to date, nor a comprehensive set of rules governing 
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the substantial acquisition of shares. Nevertheless, ZSE follows the guidelines of 
the City Code in London and those of the Securities Exchange in South Africa. 
In addition, ZSE has issued some directives aimed at protection of minority 
shareholders. These directives include a provision that any person or body 
corporate that acquires thirty five percent or more of the share capital of a listed 
company must make an offer for the outstanding shares. The Companies Act 
guarantees minority shareholders the right to participate and vote in company 
meetings and shareholder ballots. The Company Law sets forth, subject to any 
restrictions attached to any class of shares, the one share one vote principle at 
annual or special shareholders' meetings. The Law authorises by-laws to limit 
the number of votes of each class of shareholders. Shareholders, representing 
five percent of the paid-up capital also have the power to call an extraordinary 
meeting. Shareholders are not required to attend meetings in order to vote. They 
may cast vote by using a proxy form or postal vote and are entitled to appoint 
another person as proxy.  
 
2.4.2 Disclosure Regulation 
As a former British colony, Zimbabwe adapted UK-based accounting systems on 
gaining independence, thus follows a disclosure-based regime. The Companies 
Act (Chapter 24:03) is the main statute governing corporate reporting in 
Zimbabwe, and this was modelled on the UK’s 1948 Companies Act (Owusu-
Ansah, 1998). Although there is no securities exchange commission in 
Zimbabwe to date, companies, both public and private, must file a prospectus 
with the registrar of companies upon incorporation. The prospectus should 
include basic information on the company and its directors, including their term 
of appointment, ownership interests and remuneration, as well as basic details 
concerning the company’s accountants, lawyers, and bankers. Information must 
also be provided on all material contracts and current litigation.  
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The Companies Act requires companies registered under it to keep accounting 
records that sufficiently and accurately explain their financial position and 
performance. Specifically, every company is required to keep, in the English 
language, proper books of accounts regarding its assets and liabilities, sales 
and purchases, all sums received and expended and the matters in respect of 
which the receipts and expenditures took place (s.140 (1)). The Act also lays 
down general provisions as to the content and form of the accounts (s.142). 
These fall into four broad categories; profit and loss provisions, balance sheet 
provisions, comparative figures, and additional provisions for holding 
companies. Holding companies are required, with certain exceptions, to prepare 
group accounts, along with company profit and loss account and balance sheet 
(s.144). Certain provisions of the Act require specific disclosures to be made, for 
example with reference to directors’ emoluments (s.184) and loans to directors 
(s.185). Although a cash flow statement is not required under the Act, it is 
stipulated under the adopted IAS 7 and is thus prepared on a consolidated basis 
as well. Besides the requirements to publish a balance sheet and a profit and 
loss account, there is also a legal obligation on companies to include a director’s 
report in their published annual report and accounts (s.147). The report should 
discuss the performance of the company during the financial year under review, 
and identify the major issues the company had to deal with, and those expected 
in the future. In addition, the Act requires the directors should report the 
amounts proposed or paid in terms of dividend and directors’ remuneration.  
The financial statements, which must be prepared on a regular basis in 
accordance with the disclosure requirements prescribed in the Seventh 
Schedule to the Act, must also give a true and fair view of the operations and 
the state of affairs of the reporting company. Every company registered in 
Zimbabwe is legally required to appoint an independent external auditor. In 
practice, the big five audit companies audit the majority of major Zimbabwean 
companies. Private companies are, however, exempt under certain 
circumstances. The auditor is required to make a report to members of the 
company on the financial statements examined by him (s.153). In the report, he 
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should express an opinion on whether the accounts have been drawn up in 
accordance with the provisions of both the Companies Act and International 
Accounting Standards, and show a true and fair view of the state of the 
company’s affairs at the balance sheet date and the companies’ operations for 
the year under review. The auditor’s report should be attached to the company’s 
financial statements, signed by at least two directors and sent to all persons 
entitled to receive notices of the company’s AGM fourteen days before the date 
of the next meeting (s.146). Audited annual financial statements are required to 
be filed with the Registrar of Companies where they will be available for public 
inspection. 
The Companies Act however, stipulates only the basic minimum requirements, 
thus disclosure rules are supplemented by the pronouncements of the 
professional accountancy body, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Zimbabwe (ICAZ), which has the primary responsibility for the establishment, 
adoption and publication of accounting standards (Chamisa, 2000). The 
procedure in establishing Zimbabwe Accounting Standards is to scrutinise IASC 
exposure drafts and completed standards for suitability to the socio-economic 
environment. On adoption, a guideline may be issued pointing out any local 
conflicts between legislation and the new standards. Following adoption, the 
government incorporates any new disclosure into the Companies Act and a note 
is taken of any future legislative amendments necessary to make the legislation 
and standards fully compatible. Although in most cases the International 
Accounting Standards are adopted in their entirety, there are a few exceptions. 
For example, small companies are not required to comply with IAS 7: Cash Flow 
Statements. 
Public listed companies are also required to comply with the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange’s listing rules on disclosure. The listing rules require that annual 
published accounts disclose certain information in addition to that required by 
the Companies Act. For example, companies’ annual financial statements must 
disclose details of securities listed for purposes of employee share schemes (s. 
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8.51(g)), the aggregate of the direct and indirect interests of the directors in the 
share capital of the listed company, distinguishing between beneficial and non-
beneficial interests (s.8.52 (d)) and the percentage of each class of listed shares 
held by public and non-public shareholders. In addition, the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange requires that companies fully disclose, in the notes to the accounts, 
all borrowings, including off balance sheet borrowings (s.8.52 (b)). Further, listed 
companies are required to disclose in their annual reports the identity of 
shareholders behind nominee companies, their cost of sales, information on the 
markets where the company is selling its products, segment reporting, and full 
disclosure of relationships with other companies. The country having recently 
been designated a hyperinflationary country; companies are required to use 
inflation accounting for the preparation of their reports. In addition to audited 
annual financial statements, listed companies should publish half-yearly interim 
reports and provisional annual financial statements (s.8.44). However, there is 
no legal requirement for interim accounts to be audited.  
Listed companies are obliged to report any relevant, material information 
necessary to enable present and potential investors to appraise their financial 
position and performance. Consequently, Section 8.52(a) of the listing 
requirements stipulates that companies are required to comment on the extent 
of their compliance, or non compliance, with the Code of Corporate Practices 
and Conduct as set out in the King Report (South Africa) or the Combined Code 
on Corporate Governance (United Kingdom). This statement should be 
sufficiently detailed to enable its shareholders and potential investors to evaluate 
how the principles have been applied. Other than the mandatory disclosures on 
the composition and compensation of the board of directors, their ownership 
interests, and terms of appointment which are required to be disclosed in the 
company’s prospectus upon incorporation, corporate governance disclosures 
are largely voluntary in Zimbabwe. For example, there are no provisions in either 
the Companies Act or the Stock Exchange Act regarding the disclosure of 
substantial shareholders who own more than a specific percentage of the share 
capital of the company. Similarly, the Stock Exchange Act does not contain rules 
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regarding the substantial acquisition of shares, or concerning the disclosure of 
ownership of shareholders when they pass certain thresholds, as is the case in 
modern stock exchanges.  Additionally, discussion of risk management is not 
compulsory in annual reports, though strongly encouraged by the accounting 
profession.  
The ICAZ monitors corporate reporting compliance in Zimbabwe. Like the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the ICAZ employs a review method in 
monitoring and enforcing compliance with statutory and regulatory disclosure 
requirements (Owusu-Ansah, 1998).  
 
2.4.3 Board Composition and Ownership Structure  
 
Zimbabwean companies are governed by a single tier board structure. The 
board of directors is the ultimate body governing the corporation and is 
responsible for ensuring that the company operates within its articles of 
association, in compliance with the Companies Act and common law, and in 
accordance with resolutions passed at shareholders meetings and at meetings 
of directors. Directors must demonstrate duties of loyalty, care, skill and 
attendance. They have a fiduciary relationship to the company and some 
obligations towards the shareholders. They must observe the utmost good faith 
in their dealings with the company, exercise their powers for its benefit and not 
their own, and ensure that they avoid conflicts of interests between themselves 
and the company.  
 
The Companies Act requires every company to have at least two directors, at 
least one of which must be residing in Zimbabwe (s.169), although most 
companies have six or seven. Directors may appoint alternates subject to board 
approval. The Companies Act imposes a duty on directors, through the 
company’s articles of association, to hold a specified share qualification (s.172). 
Directors can hold any other office inside or outside the company, other than the 
office of auditor of the company, in conjunction with their office of director for a 
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term as determined by the board of directors. Where such director acts in a 
professional capacity for the company he is entitled to remuneration for 
professional services. There is no distinction of duties between executive and 
non-executive directors and no legal definition of an independent director, 
although in practice a non-executive director is understood to be fulfilling such a 
role. Usually the managing directors, as well as the marketing and finance 
directors, are the executive directors, although it depends on the management 
structure adopted by the company in question. Directors can set up committees 
of the board and delegate its powers to them but there are no legal requirements 
for inclusion of specific committees. However, in practice, both listed and 
unlisted companies have board committees such as audit, remuneration, 
investment, general purpose and technical committees, depending on the nature 
and scope of their activities.  
 
While data on the structure of ownership of listed companies is scant, 
preliminary research (Magaisa, 2004) indicates that a major shareholder, or 
small group of shareholders, dominates the typical Zimbabwean company. In 
practice, corporate groups dominate the Zimbabwean economy, with often-
complex cross-holdings and cross-directorships between the companies 
comprising the corporate group. Institutional shareholders are courted to provide 
the much-needed cash resources, thus institutions such as Old Mutual, Anglo 
American Corporation, First Mutual Life Assurance Society, NSSA, and several 
pension funds own some 70% of the listed shares.   
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has placed the study into context by outlining the economic and 
regulatory environment for Zimbabwean businesses. Overall, Zimbabwean 
company law is very similar to UK company law due to the colonial and, until 
recently, economic ties between the two countries. The adoption of International 
Accounting Standards, and the presence and active participation of the big five 
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audit companies, in Zimbabwe greatly enhances the accounting and corporate 
disclosure environment in Zimbabwe. 
 
CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The chapter reviews relevant literature with a view to identify the gaps to be 
filled by this study, and the theories and themes used in extant disclosure 
literature to enable the development of testable hypotheses. Seven hypotheses 
are developed. These hypotheses seek to establish the strength and direction of 
relationships between certain variables and the transparency of the sample 
companies. These variables are split into corporate governance variables, and 
company-specific attributes. The corporate governance variables are ownership 
concentration, audit committee composition, cross-directorships, and foreign 
ownership, while company-specific characteristics are company size, 
profitability, and leverage. 
 
3.2 Prior Studies 
One objective of this study is to determine how both corporate governance 
mechanisms and company-specific attributes affect a company’s transparency 
behaviour. Empirical research on corporate disclosure and transparency has a 
long history, dating back to work by Cerf (1961). Healy and Palepu (2001) give a 
comprehensive analysis of empirical disclosure literature. In their view current 
research has been on three broad areas; disclosure regulation (for example, 
Leftwich, 1980; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; and Beaver, 1998); auditors and 
other information intermediaries (for example, Dodd et al, 1984; 1986; Dopuch 
et al, 1986, 1987; Lang and Ludholm, 1993, and Barth and Hutton, 2000); and 
 20 
the determinants and corporate consequences of corporate disclosure (for 
example Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Healy and Palepu, 1993,1995). In the 
last category, several company characteristics have been found to have an 
impact on disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003). Characteristics found to have a 
significant impact include; in Singhvi and Desai (1971) listing status and 
earnings margin; Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) firm size, financial leverage and 
proportion of assets in place; Meek et al. (1995) firm size, international listing 
status, leverage and country of incorporation.  
The framework for linking disclosure to corporate governance is provided in 
Williamson (1985). Recent empirical work on the association between disclosure 
and corporate governance has focused on the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure. A variety of corporate governance mechanisms affecting disclosure 
have been identified in the literature. These include ownership structure (for 
example Craswell and Taylor, 1992; McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; Hossain, 
Tan and Adams, 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Bushee and Noe, 2001), the 
proportion or existence of independent directors (for example Forker, 1992; 
Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993, Chen and Jaggi, 2000), the appointment of non-
executive director as chairman, (for example Forker, 1992), and the existence of 
an audit committee (Forker, 1992). A summary of various relevant studies is 
provided at the end of this chapter, in table 1. 
 
Although there have been several studies on the determinants of corporate 
transparency, further research is warranted by the generally ambiguous and 
inconsistent results. Wallace and Naser (1995) attribute the inconsistencies to 
the lack of uniformity in the statistical designs employed, and the differing nature 
of the explanatory variables employed. Owusu-Ansah (1998) suggests the 
inconsistencies could also be due to the differing socio-economic environments 
of the countries investigated. Although countries may broadly be classified as 
either developed or emerging, each country is unique in its own right. Findings 
of studies on the development of capital markets have provided evidence 
supporting the significant role of culture and legal systems on the development 
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of corporate ownership, corporate capital structure, and capital markets (for 
example; La Porta et al, 1997; La Porta et al. 1998). Therefore, the findings of 
studies in the US, UK and Asian markets may not be applicable to African 
economies due to different cultural, legal, and political environments. 
 
This study seeks to fill a gap in literature by examining corporate transparency, 
and the relationship between corporate governance variables, and company 
specific attributes, and corporate transparency in the African economy of 
Zimbabwe. Little is known of the transparency levels of Zimbabwean 
businesses. In 1998, Owusu-Ansah carried out an empirical investigation on the 
adequacy of corporate mandatory disclosure practices on emerging markets, 
with the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange as his case study. His findings indicate that 
mandatory disclosure in Zimbabwean businesses is largely adequate and 
associated with such company characteristics as company size (market 
capitalisation/assets), mutlinationality, company age, and profitability and the 
corporate governance mechanism of ownership concentration. However, the 
Zimbabwean economy has gone through a great deal of turmoil since 1998, 
therefore it would be interesting to find out whether the economic decline of the 
past five years will have had any significant impact on the transparency of 
businesses. While Owusu-Ansah focused on mandatory disclosure, the 
scorecard used in this study comprises thirty-three percent mandatory and sixty-
seven percent voluntary disclosure items.  
 
Moreover, this study will add a new dimension to the literature by using different 
proxies for various variables investigated in previous studies. For example, the 
commonly used proxy for the ownership concentration variable is the proportion 
of shares held by the top ten or twenty shareholders. This study will use the 
presence of a controlling shareholder as a proxy for the variable. It is a more 
appropriate measurement in this study because controlling shareholders are a 
common phenomenon in Zimbabwean businesses and therefore, their potential 
impact on corporate transparency may be significant. Secondly, the impact of 
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the audit committee variable is investigated in several studies, but given the 
dummy variable of one for existence, and nil for non-existence. As all the 
companies in this study’s sample have an audit committee, the more suitable 
proxy of proportion of non-executive directors on the committee is adopted. 
Finally, this will be the second study, to the researcher’s knowledge, to 
empirically investigate the impact of cross-directorships on the transparency of 
businesses. The only other study to investigate this found a non-significant 
relationship in Malaysian companies (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).  
 
3.3 Theoretical Framework  
 
Transparency, and disclosure, as topics span several literatures, including 
accounting, finance, economics, political economy, sociology, psychology, and 
corporate governance, thus inevitably take on features of those literatures 
(Verrecchia, 2001). Academic writers disagree on what, if any, the theory of 
disclosure is. According to Verrecchia (2001), there is no comprehensive or 
unifying theory of disclosure. He views the disclosure literature as “an eclectic 
commingling of highly idiosyncratic (and highly stylised), economics-based 
models, each of which attempting to examine some small piece of the overall 
disclosure puzzle“.  Dye (2001), on the other hand, posits that while there is no 
received theory on mandatory disclosure, there is a theory of voluntary 
disclosures, and several empirical studies have corroborated this by relying on 
several theories to develop hypotheses and interpret study results. 
 
Dye (2001) argues that the theory of voluntary disclosure is a special case of 
game theory, with the following as its central premise; any entity contemplating 
making a disclosure will disclose information that is favourable to the entity, and 
will not disclose unfavourable information. This mirrors Ross’ (1979) signalling 
theory, which argues that companies with good news are more likely to disclose 
more information. This theory therefore assumes that better performing 
companies would have better levels of disclosure than poorly performing 
companies.  However, it has been argued that a company with a less 
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satisfactory performance might be tempted to improve the quality of its narrative 
statements in order to down play and justify the poor financial position (Labelle, 
2002), thus enhancing transparency. 
 
Theorists and researchers often invoke agency theory as a justification for 
disclosure. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency relationship as a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engages another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. The agency problem 
arises from conflicting interests between principal and agent and the resulting 
information asymmetry, thus increasing the potential for the principal to be 
exploited in such a relationship. Jensen and Meckling (1976) have suggested 
several ways that seek to align the interests of agents and principals, thereby 
mitigating the agency problem. Firstly, the principal can expend resources to 
monitor the activities of the agent through measuring, observing, and controlling 
the agent’s behaviour, for example, through audits. Certain aspects of 
monitoring may also be imposed by legislative practices. Non-compliance with 
regulations must be disclosed and explained, and the attention brought by these 
statements of non-compliance represents an additional source of monitoring. 
Secondly, the principal can set up appropriate incentives for the agent to limit 
excessive behaviour, for example through share options as a form of executive 
compensation. Finally, the agent can undertake bonding activities either to 
ensure the principal that he will not jeopardise his interests or will compensate 
him for any loss sustained by him as a result thereof. Disclosure is widely 
viewed as one such bonding activity. However, whether agency theory 
adequately explains the disclosure policies of organisations is open to debate 
and, as demonstrated in the hypotheses development and results section of this 
paper, empirical evidence varies. 
 
Proponents of the free market theory argue that if the above measures fail to 
achieve the desired behaviour of corporate managers, several other means 
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derived from market discipline (for example; the market for corporate control and 
information intermediaries) can control these problems. Free market economy 
theorists view information as a public good and argue that the market forces of 
demand and supply will interact to provide the desired level of corporate 
disclosure (Passmore, 1953). Corporate finance theory predicts that 
shareholders endogenously optimise disclosure policy, corporate governance, 
and management incentives in order to maximise firm value. This choice 
involves trading off the reduction in the information asymmetry component of the 
cost of capital that results from increased disclosure quality against the costs of 
reduced incentives, litigation costs (Skinner, 1994), and proprietary costs 
(Verrecchia, 1983). The optimal amount of corporate information would thus be 
supplied at the level the costs equal the benefits of supplying the information. 
According to this theory, companies will supply information based on the 
covenants contained in private lending contracts and the stewardship of 
managers to the owners of the company. The achievement of this perfectly 
credible optimum level of disclosure has been disputed however. Opponents of 
this theory argue that it is too costly to eliminate all manipulation, thus managers 
will add some bias to disclosure at a low personal cost (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). Shleifer and Vishny (1997), on the other hand, argue that while the 
optimal disclosure policy allows some managerial manipulation, corporate 
governance structures will constrain the manager to follow the optimal policy.  
 
The proprietary costs theory holds that companies’ decisions to be transparent 
are influenced by concern that such transparency will damage their competitive 
position in product markets (for example, Verrecchia, 1983; Darrough and 
Stoughton, 1990; Darrough, 1993; Gigler, 1994). However, the incentive not to 
disclose appears to be sensitive to the nature of the competition, in particular 
whether companies face existing competitors or merely the threat of entry. The 
proprietary cost theory has been criticised for assuming no conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders. As a result, it assumes that voluntary 
disclosure will always be credible. Hayes and Lundolhm (1996) argue that 
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proprietary costs induce companies to provide disaggregated data only when 
they have similarly performing business segments. Companies with widely 
varying performance across business segments have incentives to conceal 
these differences from competitors. There has, however, been relatively little 
empirical support for the proprietary cost theory (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
 
 
Other theorists argue that the “lemons” problem arising from information 
differences and conflicting incentives between entrepreneurs and savers in 
capital markets creates an incentive for managers to provide voluntary 
disclosure to reduce the cost of capital. Thus, the cost of capital theory holds 
that when disclosure is imperfect, investors bear risks in forecasting the future 
payoffs from their investment (Barry and Brown, 1984). If this risk is non-
diversifiable, investors will demand an incremental return for bearing the 
information risk. As a result, companies with high levels of disclosure, and hence 
low information risk, are likely to have a lower cost of capital than the companies 
with low disclosure levels and high information risk. Some empirical evidence 
has corroborated this theory (for example; Botosan, 1997; Piotroski, 1999; Choi, 
1973; Elliot and Jacobson, 1994). 
Finally, several researchers have suggested that the disclosure practices of 
companies are affected by the legal origin of the country in which they operate. 
Prior evidence suggests that corporate reporting is more transparent in countries 
with a common law (vs. civil law) legal tradition (Jaggi and Low, 2000). The 
economics literature offers at least two reasons why common law countries 
provide stronger protection of outside investors’ rights (for example, Beck et al. 
2002). First, legal traditions differ in the priority given to the rights of individuals’ 
vis-à-vis the state. Under this theory, the decentralised nature of the English 
common law evolved to generally protect property rights of individuals. Second, 
legal traditions may differ in their ability to adapt quickly to changing 
circumstances and minimise gaps between contracting needs and the legal 
systems’ capabilities. 
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3.4 Hypotheses Development 
 
The overall level of transparency is probably a function of several components. 
One potential component is related to the corporate governance structures, for 
example ownership structure. Another possibility is that transparency is related 
to company-specific characteristics, such as size and gearing. The second 
objective of this study is to explain the variability Zimbabwean companies’ 
transparency levels in terms of both corporate governance variables and 
company-specific attributes. A combination of corporate governance and 
company characteristics has been chosen for analysis in this study. The 
selected corporate governance attributes are ownership concentration, cross 
directorships, audit committee and foreign ownership. Company characteristics 
chosen are company size, leverage, and profitability. Attributes have been 
selected based on the availability of data on them, their ability to facilitate 
classification of the sample companies into sub-samples without ambiguity, and 
their relevance to the socio-economic environment of Zimbabwe.  
 
In theory, the impact of internal governance mechanisms on corporate 
transparency may be complementary or substitutive (Ho & Wong, 2001). If it is 
complementary, agency theory predicts that a greater extent of transparency is 
expected since the adoption of more governance mechanisms will strengthen 
the internal control of companies and provide an “intensive monitoring package” 
for a firm to reduce opportunistic behaviours and information asymmetry 
(Leftwich et al; 1981; Welker, 1995). On the other hand, if the relationship is 
substitutive, companies will not provide more disclosures for more governance 
mechanisms since one corporate governance mechanism may substitute 
another. If information asymmetry in a company can be reduced because of the 
existing “internal monitoring packages”, the need for additional governance 
devices is reduced. In spite of this theoretical ambiguity, Hill (1999) suggests 
that it is desirable to have a system of overlapping checks and balances. 
Therefore, the hypotheses about the effect of internal governance mechanisms 
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in this study are mainly predictions of a positive association. 
 
3.4.1 Corporate Governance Variables 
I. Ownership Concentration 
According to positive agency theory, a wider dispersion of share ownership is 
associated with extensive transparency. The separation of ownership and 
control generates agency costs resulting from conflicting interests between 
management and owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Because agency costs tend to be higher for companies with dispersed share 
ownership, shareholders press for more information disclosure for monitoring 
purposes. This is consistent with Francis et al; (2002) who argue that less 
‘outsider’ ownership results in less information asymmetry between ‘insider’ and 
‘outsider’ shareholders, therefore ownership concentration reduces the need for 
strong corporate governance and transparency.  
Many authors argue that the raison d’etre of corporate governance, in any 
country, is to protect the interests of shareholders because the interests of other 
investors can adequately be protected through the contractual relations with the 
company.  However, outside the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom, the corporation with widely dispersed ownership is not the rule, but the 
exception (La Porta et al, 1999). What prevail are corporations with large block 
holders who directly control managers. The use of pyramids and other devices 
to increase dominant shareholders’ control over corporate resources may 
constitute a functional alternative to improved corporate governance and better 
protection of minority shareholders’ rights in terms of its allowing corporate 
insiders to gain access to extra-firm sources of investment finance (Oman, 
2001). There is, therefore, a contrary view to the explanation offered by agency 
theory. Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) argue that dispersed individual 
shareholders are not a formidable influence on corporate outcomes, including 
disclosure policies and practices, even if the net benefits are great enough to 
provide significant incentives to become informed. Their argument implies that 
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where there is diffuse share ownership, individual public shareholders do not 
have the same bargaining power vis-à-vis the company to access internal 
information. Similarly, McColgan (2001) posits that ordinary atomistic 
shareholders may not have the time, skill, or interest to monitor managerial 
activities. Since they own a small proportion of the total shares, there may be a 
free-rider problem where it is not in their best interests to monitor management 
while others also derive the benefits. The existence of a large block investor 
may thus overcome this problem, as they have a greater financial incentive to 
monitor management. However, devices to separate corporate ownership rights 
from the control of corporate resources may serve to facilitate and camouflage 
self-dealing and related rent seeking behaviour.  
Interestingly, empirical evidence is also contradictory. McKinnon and Dalimunthe 
(1993), and Mitchell et al. (1995), both find weak support for the hypothesis that 
increased ownership concentration decreases the disclosure of segment 
information, while Owusu-Ansah (1998) found a statistically significant positive 
relationship between concentrated ownership and the extent of mandatory 
disclosure in Zimbabwean companies. Haniffa & Cooke (2002), on the other 
hand, found a significant negative relationship between ownership concentration 
and voluntary disclosure, as did Ho & Wong (2001) in Hong Kong companies, 
implying that companies choose to disclose less, perhaps to avoid losing 
control. Following agency theory it is hypothesised that: 
H1 Companies with a greater concentration of shareholding are likely to have 
lower levels of transparency  
 
II. Audit Committees and Independent Directors 
Regulators and corporate governance experts consider the audit committee as 
the entity that is at the core of the corporate reporting process (Mangena and 
Tauringana, 2004). The Cadbury Code (1992) recommended that all companies 
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should establish audit committees, and the Smith Report (2003) provided 
detailed guidance on the role and responsibilities of the audit committee. These 
responsibilities include monitoring the integrity of the company’s financial 
statements and reviewing internal control systems. Agency theory predicts the 
setting up of audit committees as a means of attenuating agency costs. Forker 
(1992) argued that the existence of audit committees may improve internal 
control and thus regarded it as an effective monitoring device for improving 
disclosure quality. Since audit committees are largely made up of non-executive 
directors, it is expected that this reduces the scope that management perceive 
for acting opportunistically and improves transparency.  
Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that effective corporate boards would be 
composed largely of outside independent directors holding managerial positions 
in other companies. Monitoring of corporate boards by non-executive directors 
suggests that corporate boards will become more responsive to investors, and 
inclusion of non-executive directors on board committees will improve the 
company’s compliance with the disclosure requirements which in turn will 
enhance the comprehensiveness of disclosures and thus enhance transparency 
(Forker, 1992). Empirical evidence appears to lend support to this theory. For 
example; Ajinkya et al. (2003), Balachandran & Bliss (2004), Chen & Jaggi, 
(2000), and Ho & Wong (2001) all found a significant positive relationship 
between the proportion of outside directors and corporate disclosure. However, 
in their investigation of corporate financial disclosure in the oil and gas industry 
in the United States, Malone et al. (1993) did not find a significant relationship 
between the proportion of outside directors and the extent of financial 
disclosure. This may be explained in terms of the industry-specificity of their 
study. Further, Forker (1992) found a positive but weak relationship between the 
disclosure of the audit committee and the quality of share option disclosure for 
U.K companies. To the extent that audit committees are designed to align 
managers’ interest with those of shareholders, it would be expected that:  
H2 Companies with a higher proportion of non-executive directors on the audit 
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committee are more likely to have higher levels of transparency  
 
III. Cross Directorships 
Cross-directorships refer to a situation where directors (executive and/or non-
executive) sit on more than one board. Several studies have documented that 
these board interlocks have important implications on the governance function 
as they are related to independence of directors in a unitary, versus compound, 
board. For example, Davis (1996) argues that cross directorships put companies 
at a competitive disadvantage and, in the case of executive directors, their 
existence on more than one board will make them less independent as they will 
be more sympathetic with others in similar positions. Those against interlocks 
argue that they are devices for intercorporate collusion (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978), bank control over corporate decision-making (Kotz, 1978), and for the 
aggregation and advancement of the collective interests of the corporate elite 
(Useem, 1984). Proponents of cross directorships argue that when a director 
sits on more than one board, the company’s preference for confidentiality and 
restriction on disclosure of information is deterred (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). It 
has also been argued that the ‘individualistic’ nature of companies will no longer 
hold because information will be shared among the companies through their 
directors (Gray, 1988). Consequently, companies will now become transparent 
and the preservation of information will be less. In their study of culture, 
corporate governance and disclosure in Malaysia, however, Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) did not find cross-directorships to have a significant effect on corporate 
disclosure. Cross directorships are a common phenomenon in Zimbabwean 
companies, the aggregate result being the creation of an interlocking directorate 
linking many of the large companies into a single network based on shared 
board members. Following agency theory, it is hypothesised; 
H3 Companies whose executive directors sit on other boards are likely to have 
higher levels of transparency  
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IV. Foreign Ownership 
Strategic management scholars argue that internationalisation increases the 
complexity and uncertainty of a firm’s business operations. Stakeholders are 
then likely to place greater pressure on the firm to ensure it implements effective 
monitoring mechanisms. For example, the performance, behaviour, and 
consequences of the operations of multi national corporations and their local 
affiliates are frequently monitored by political pressure groups and international 
government agencies (Meek et al. 1995). Thus, foreign investors are more likely 
to require full compliance with all statutory and regulatory requirements of the 
host countries for their affiliates. Secondly, technology transfers, including 
accounting and disclosure practices often accompany foreign direct investments 
(Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Consequently, affiliates are likely to have more 
sophisticated financial reporting systems that facilitate greater disclosure in their 
annual reports than other non-affiliated companies. Empirical studies have 
produced mixed results. While evidence of a positive correlation is found in 
studies by Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), Haniffa and Cooke, (2002), Jaggi and 
Low (2000), and Owusu-Ansah, (1998), Meek et al. (1995) finds no significant 
correlation. Based on empirical evidence, this study predicts a positive 
correlation and hypothesises: 
 
 
H4 Companies with some foreign ownership are more likely to have higher 
levels of transparency  
 
3.4.2 Company Characteristics 
 
There has been extensive empirical work relating company-specific 
characteristics to the extent of corporate disclosure based on a number of 
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theoretical arguments, which include agency, signalling, capital cost, and game 
theories. Three variables viz. size, leverage, and profitability that have been 
tested in previous studies are included in this study. 
V. Company Size  
 
Economic theory, intuition, and empirical evidence suggest that the size of a 
company is positively related to transparency. Leftwich et al. (1981), and Ball 
and Foster (1982), maintain that firm size is a comprehensive variable that can 
proxy for a number of corporate attributes, such as competitive advantage, 
information production costs, and political costs. Thus, many reasons have been 
advanced in the literature in an attempt to justify this relationship on a priori 
grounds. For example, Buzby (1975) argues that disclosure puts small 
companies in competitive disadvantage with their large counterparts in the 
industry. Thus, the opportunity cost of corporate disclosure may be higher than 
for the larger companies. Watts and Zimmerman (1986), and Cahan (1992), put 
forward political visibility as another potential reason for expecting a positive 
relationship between firm size and disclosure. Likewise, Firth (1979) suggests 
that firms that are more visible in the “public eye” are likely to voluntarily disclose 
information to enhance their public image and corporate reputation. Thirdly, it 
has been established that increased disclosure reduces a company’s cost of 
capital (Choi, 1973; Elliot and Jacobson, 1994) and, since large companies rely 
more heavily on securities markets for financing of their operations, it follows 
that they would disclose more extensively than smaller companies. Fourth, 
empirical evidence confirms the hypothesised positive relationship between 
company size and corporate transparency (Cerf, 1961; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
Inchausti, 1997, Owusu-Ansah, 1998). As noted by Foster (1986), “the variable 
most consistently reported as significant in studies examining differences across 
firms in their disclosure policy is firm size”. Finally, in the agency theory 
literature, Jensen and Meckling contend that agency costs increase with the 
amount of outside capital. Agency theory thus predicts that larger firms will 
disclose more information to alleviate the potential for wealth transfers from 
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suppliers of outside capital to managers. Consequently, it is hypothesised: 
H5 (a) Companies with a higher turnover are more likely to have higher levels of 
transparency  
H5 (b) Companies with a higher total assets value are more likely to have higher 
levels of transparency  
 
VI. Leverage 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that leverage is related to the magnitude of 
external agency costs, thus agency costs increase as the proportion of the 
company’s capital contributed by debt holders increases. The existence of debt 
provides managers with incentives to adopt investment policies that would 
increase the value of stock while decreasing the value of debt. The potential 
conflict of interest results in demand for credible corporate reporting to debt 
holders by managers (Etteredge et al. 1994).  Thus, more highly leveraged firms 
will incur greater monitoring costs and, in an effort to reduce these costs, firms 
will disclose more information. Empirical evidence of the association between 
leverage and the extent of transparency is inconclusive however. While Malone 
et al. (1993) and Chow & Wong-Boren (1987) find a significantly positive 
correlation; Meek et al. (1995) find a significant, but negative correlation 
between leverage and corporate disclosure. Yet another set of studies find no 
significant correlation between the two (for example; Inchausti, 1997; McKinnon 
and Dalimunthe, 1993; Raffournier, 1995 and Williams, 2002). Despite the 
inconclusive empirical results, it is hypothesised based on agency theory: 
 
 
H6 Companies with higher leverage ratios are more likely to have higher levels 
of transparency  
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VII. Profit 
Signalling theory argues that companies with good news are more likely to 
disclose more information (Ross, 1979). Thus, it would be expected that 
managers of profitable companies would be motivated to disclose more 
information in order to distinguish themselves from the less profitable 
companies. However, Labelle (2002) argues that the direction of the relationship 
between firm performance and transparency is not clear. For instance, a 
company with a less satisfactory performance might be tempted to improve the 
quality of its narrative statements, in order to down play and justify the poor 
financial position. Empirical evidence appears to support both positions. For 
example, while studies by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Singhvi and Desai 
(1971) provide empirical evidence of a positive association between profitability 
and disclosure, Inchausti (19970, Meek et al. (1995), find no significant 
correlation between profitability and the level of disclosure in Spanish firms, and 
the US, UK, and continental European multinational corporations respectively. 
However, following signalling theory, this study predicts; 
H7 Profitable companies are more likely to have higher levels of transparency  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed relevant literature and developed seven testable 
hypotheses therefrom. The hypotheses developed state the expected direction 
of impact of four corporate governance, and three company-specific, variables 
on transparency. These variables are ownership concentration, audit committee, 
cross-directorships, foreign ownership, size, leverage, and profitability. Although 
these variables have been investigated in prior studies, this study adds a new 
dimension by using different proxies for the ownership concentration and audit 
committee variables. Further, it investigates the impact of cross-directorships, 
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which, to the researcher’s knowledge, has been investigated in only one prior 
study. The following chapter explains the methods employed to collect data and 
test these hypotheses. 
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Table 1: Summary of Literature Relating Corporate Governance Variables and Company Attributes to  
Corporate Disclosure 
Researcher(s) and 
Year 
 
Country and Sample 
Size 
Object of Study Significant Variables 
             (+/-) 
Non-Significant Variables 
(+/-) 
Ahmed & Nicholls 
(1994) 
Bangladesh (1987/88; 
N=65) 
Mandatory Disclosure Family members on the board (-), size of 
audit firm (+), multinational company 
influence (+), company size (assets & 
sales)(+) 
Leverage (+) 
Ajinkya et al (2003) United States 
(N=1033 btn 1997 
and 2000) 
Voluntary 
Management 
Forecasts 
Institutional ownership (+), proportion of 
outside directors (+), ownership 
concentration (-) 
 
Balachandran & Bliss 
(2004) 
Malaysia  
(2001; N=200) 
Voluntary Disclosure Proportion of independent directors on the 
board (+), independent directors on the 
audit committe (+),role duality (-), 
company size (market capitalisation)(-) 
Big 5 auditor (-) 
Buzby (1975) United States 
(1970/71; N=88) 
Extent Disclosure 
(Generalist view) 
Company size (assets),  Listing status (+) 
Cerf (1961) United States 
(N=145) 
 Number of shareholders (+), company size 
(assets) (+), listing status (+), profitability 
(+) 
 
 
 
Chau & Gray (2002) 
 
Hong Kong & 
Singapore (1997; 
N=122) 
Voluntary Disclosure Ownership diffusion (+), 
Family ownership (-) 
Company size (+), leverage 
(+), audit firm (+), 
profitability  
(-), industry (+) 
Chen & Jaggi (2000)  Hong Kong (N= 
87 between 1993 and 
1994) 
Mandatory Disclosure Proportion of outside directors (+), family 
ownership (-) 
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Table 1: Summary of Literature Relating Corporate Governance Variables and Company Attributes to  
Corporate Disclosure (continued) 
 
Researcher(s) 
and Year 
 
Country and Sample 
Size 
Object of Study Significant Variables 
             (+/-) 
Non-Significant Variables 
(+/-) 
Chow & Wong-
Boren (1987) 
Mexico (1982; N=52) Extent Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Company size (market 
capitalisation) (+) leverage (+) 
Assets in place (-) 
 
 
Cooke (1992) Japan (1988; N=35) Mandatory and 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Company size (assets & 
shareholders’ funds) (+), Industry 
type (+), listing status (+) 
 
Craswell & 
Taylor (1992) 
Australia (1984; N=86) Disclosure of 
Reserves by Oil 
and Gas 
Companies 
Auditor type (+), company size 
(assets) (+) 
 
Ownership diffusion (+), 
leverage (+), cash flow risk 
(-) 
Eng & Mak 
(2003) 
Singapore (N=158 
between 1991 and 
1995) 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Government ownership (+), 
managerial ownership (-), 
proportion of outside directors (-), 
company size (market 
capitalisation) (+), leverage (-) 
 
 
Firer & 
Williams (2003) 
Singapore (2000; 
N=390) 
Intellectual Capital 
Disclosures 
Government ownership 
(+),concentrated ownership (-), 
percentage of  inside director 
ownership (-) 
 
Firth (1979) United Kingdom 
(N=180) 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Listing status (+), company size 
(assets & turnover) (+) 
Auditor type (+) 
Forker (1992) United Kingdom 
(1987/88; N=182) 
Share Option 
Disclosures  
Audit committees (+), big six 
auditor (-), dominant personality (-
), cost of disclosure (-), company 
size (market capitalisation) 
Outside directors (+) 
Gelb (2000)  United States (N= 
3 219 between 1981 
and 1993) 
Mandatory and 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Managerial ownership (-)  
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Table 1: Summary of Literature Relating Corporate Governance Variables and Company Attributes to  
Corporate Disclosure (continued) 
 
Researcher(s) 
and Year 
 
Country and Sample 
Size 
Object of Study Significant Variables 
             (+/-) 
Non-Significant Variables 
(+/-) 
Haniffa & 
Cooke (2002) 
Malaysia (1995; 
N=167) 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Ownership diffusion (+), 
non-executive board chairman (-), 
family members on the board (-), 
assets-in-place (+), profitability (+) 
Auditor type (+), cross-
directorship (-) 
Ho & Wong 
(2001) 
Hong Kong (N=98) Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Audit committee (+), family 
members on board (-)  
Dominant personality (-) 
proportion of outside 
directors (-) 
 
Hossain et al 
(1994) 
 
Malaysia (1991; N=67) Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Company size (market 
capitalisation) (+), foreign listing 
(+), ownership, concentration (-) 
Assets-in-place (-), auditor 
type (+) 
Inchausti 
(1997) 
Spain (N=49 between 
1989 and 1991) 
Mandatory and 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Company size (assets & sales) 
(+), audit firm (+), cross-listings (+) 
Profitability (+), leverage (+), 
dividend payout (-) 
Jaggi & Low 
(2000) 
28 Countries (N=505) Mandatory and 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Company size (assets) (+), debt 
ratio (common law countries) (+), 
debt ratio (code law countries) (-), 
market capitalisation (+), multi-
nationality (+) 
 
Leung & 
Horwitz (2004) 
Hong Kong (1996; 
N=376) 
Voluntary 
Segment 
Disclosure 
Proportion of outside directors 
(+),concentrated board ownership 
(-) 
 
Malone et al 
(1993) 
United States (N=125) Financial 
Disclosures in the 
Oil and Gas 
Industry 
Leverage (+), number of 
shareholders (+), stock exchange 
listing (+) 
Proportion of outside 
directors (-), auditor type (+)
McKinnon & 
Dalimunthe 
(1993) 
Australia (1984; N=65) Voluntary 
Disclosure of 
Segment 
Information 
Ownership diffusion (+), company 
size (number of shareholders) (+) 
Minority interest in 
subsidiaries (+), diversity 
(+), industry type (+), 
leverage (+) 
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Table 1: Summary of Literature Relating Corporate Governance Variables and Company Attributes to  
Corporate Disclosure (continued) 
 
Researcher(s) 
and Year 
 
Country and Sample 
Size 
Object of Study Significant Variables 
             (+/-) 
Non-Significant Variables 
(+/-) 
McNally et al. 
(1982) 
New Zealand (1979; 
N=103) 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Company size (assets) (+)  Industry type (+.), auditor 
type (+.) 
 
Meek et al 
(1995) 
US, UK, & Europe 
(France, Germany, 
Netherlands) 
(1989; N=226) 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Company size (turnover) (+), 
listing status (+), industry type (+), 
leverage (-) 
Mutlinationality (+), 
profitability (+) 
 
 
 
Mitchell et al 
(1995) 
Australia (1983; 
N=129)  
Voluntary 
Disclosure of 
Segment 
Information 
Ownership diffusion (+), leverage 
(+), company size (market 
capitalisation) (+), industry type (+) 
 
 
 
 
 
Owusu-Ansah 
(1998) 
Zimbabwe (1994; 
N=49) 
Mandatory 
Disclosure 
Company size (market 
capitalisation/assets) (+), 
mutlinationality (+), concentrated 
ownership, company age (+), 
profitability (+),  
Industry type (-) 
Liquidity (-), audit quality (+)
Patel & Dallas 
(2002) 
United States (N=500) Voluntary and 
Mandatory 
Disclosure 
Price-to-book ratio (+), company 
size (market capitalisation) (+), 
market risk (-) 
 
Patel et al 
(2002) 
19 emerging markets 
(N=354 btn 1998 and 
2000) 
Voluntary and 
Mandatory 
Disclosure 
Price-to-book ratios (Asian 
markets) (+), price-to-book ratios 
(Brazil, Poland South Africa) (-), 
concentration of ownership (-) 
 
Pham et al 
(2004) 
Malaysia (1996 & 2001; 
N=104) 
Mandatory and 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Company size (+), diffusion of 
ownership (+), diversification (+), 
profitability (+) auditor type (-), 
audit committee (-), internal audit 
(-), family control (+) 
Board member ethnicity (+) 
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Table 1: Summary of Literature Relating Corporate Governance Variables and Company Attributes to 
Corporate Disclosure (continued) 
 
Researcher(s) 
and Year 
 
Country and Sample 
Size 
Object of Study Significant Variables 
             (+/-) 
Non-Significant Variables 
(+/-) 
Raffournier 
(1995) 
 
Switzerland (1991; 
N=161) 
Voluntary 
Financial 
Disclosure 
Company size (assets) (+), foreign 
listing (+) 
Assets-in-place (-), 
ownership diffusion  
(-), Leverage (+), profitability 
(+), size of audit firm (+) 
Rutherford 
(2003) 
 
United Kingdom (1998; 
N=419) 
Mandatory 
Narrative 
Disclosure 
Company size (net assets & 
turnover) (+), gearing (+), 
organisational complexity (+), 
performance ratios (-) 
 
Singhvi & 
Desai (1971) 
United States (N=155 
between 1965 and 
1966) 
Extent Disclosure 
(Generalist View) 
Company size (assets) (+), listing 
status (+), number of shareholders 
(+), profitability (+), number of 
shareholders (+) 
 
 
 
 
 
Tai et al. 
(1990) 
Hong Kong (N = 76) Mandatory 
Disclosure 
 Company size (+) 
Wallace et al 
(1994) 
Spain (1991; N=50) Mandatory and 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Company size (assets & turnover) 
(+), listing status (+), liquidity (-) 
 
 
Williams (2002) Singapore (N=390) Voluntary Audit 
Committee 
Disclosures 
Board size (+), proportion of 
independent directors (+), 
international affiliation (+), role 
duality (-) 
Inside director  ownership (-
) , concentrated ownership 
(+), company size (+), 
auditor type (+), leverage (-)
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter describes and analyses the processes by which empirical evidence 
on the transparency levels of Zimbabwean companies has been collected and 
analysed. The chapter begins by describing the data used in the study, and the 
methods by which the data was collected. Next, an explanation is given on how 
transparency is measured in the study and, finally, an explanation of, and 
justification for, the statistical techniques employed for hypothesis testing is 
given.  
 
4.2 Data Description 
 
The data used in this study is obtained from the annual reports of ZSE listed 
companies. Due to the relatively small number of companies listed on the 
market, all the 79 companies were contacted by post for a copy of their audited 
annual reports for the financial year ending in 2003. After a poor response to the 
first request, a second letter was sent to several stockbrokers, with a remarkably 
favourable response. Fifty-four annual reports were received, however, to 
ensure uniformity in the annual disclosure practices of the sample, some 
companies were eliminated from the sample for one of two reasons. Firstly, 
Zimbabwean financial institutions are registered under a separate statute from 
other companies, thus report under a different regulatory framework. From the 
54 reports received, 11 fell into this category, leaving 43 companies in the 
sample. Secondly, companies that are merely listed on the ZSE, but not 
incorporated under Zimbabwean law, such as Ashanti, Kinross, Pretoria 
Portland Cement, and Falcon are deemed not to be representative of the 
general population of Zimbabwean companies, and have thus been eliminated 
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from the sample. The resulting final sample of 39 companies represents about 
71% of the total population of Zimbabwean, non-financial, listed companies as at 
December 2003. Table 2 summarises the sample design: 
 
Table 2: Summary of Sample Selection Criteria 
Description 
No. Of listed 
companies 
Proportion of 
total population 
(%) 
      
Population     
Companies with equity shares on ZSE as at 31     
December 2003 79 100.00 
Less:     
Companies registered under the Banking Act 20 25.00 
Companies not incorporated in Zimbabwe 4 5.00 
  55 70.00 
Respondents   
Total 54 98.00 
Less:     
Companies registered under the Banking Act 11 20.00 
Companies not incorporated in Zimbabwe 4 7.00 
  39 71.00 
      
 
The corporate annual report has been chosen as the main data source as it is 
generally considered the most important source of corporate information 
Zimbabwe. The annual report is commonly regarded as the key accountability 
mechanism (Lamond, 1995). It is an official, regulated, and reasonably, accurate 
vehicle of disseminating both financial and non-financial information about an 
organisation. The annual reports are examined for possible information 
attributes, based on a transparency scorecard derived from Standard and Poor’s 
Transparency and Disclosure score system which addresses disclosure patterns 
along a broad spectrum of factors that affect corporate governance practices 
(Patel & Dallas, 2002). A binary scheme was used to denote the existence of an 
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information attribute, coded ‘1’ to denote existence and ‘0’ to indicate non-
existence. A score was then computed for each company, as a ratio of the 
absolute possible transparency score. In order to minimise the subjectivity 
inherent in the scoring procedure, 10 annual reports were randomly drawn form 
the sample and independently scored by a classmate. The resulting scores from 
this sample were not found to be significantly different from the results obtained 
by the present researcher. 
 
4.3 Transparency Measurement 
 
Transparency has been defined as a process by which information about 
existing conditions, decisions and actions is made accessible, visible and 
understandable (Pham et al, 2004). Similarly, Pownall and Schipper (1999) state 
that a standard requiring transparency mandates financial statements that reveal 
the events, transactions, judgements, and estimates underlying the numbers 
and their implication. However, while transparency is an intuitively appealing 
concept, there is little consensus about its measurement. For example, 
transparency has previously been measured broadly as a combination of ten 
factors, including adoption of international accounting standards (CLSA, 2001) 
and, narrowly as timeliness in incorporating economic income, particularly 
negative economic or bad news, into accounting profit (Ball et al, 2000). In this 
study, transparency is being assessed in terms of the sample companies’ 
disclosure of ninety possible corporate governance and financial items in their 
annual reports and accounts for the 2003 financial year. Corporate governance 
and financial information have been chosen because of their documented link 
with transparency. 
 
Corporate governance has been defined as the means of protecting minority 
shareholders from expropriation by managers or inside shareholders (Mitton, 
2002). The governance role is concerned with giving overall direction to the 
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enterprise, with overseeing and controlling the executive actions of 
management, and with satisfying legitimate expectations of accountability and 
regulation by interests beyond corporate boundaries (Tricker, 1984). The 
corporate governance system specifies the terms of the equity contract between 
management and the shareholders. They ensure corporate conformance with 
investors’ and society’s interests and expectations by limiting the abuse of 
power, the siphoning-off of assets, the moral hazard and the significant waste of 
corporate-controlled resources (so-called “agency problems”) that the self-
serving behaviour of managers and other corporate insiders can be expected to 
impose on society and investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Management is 
given great discretion to run the business of the corporation, while shareholders 
receive the residual income resulting from the corporation’s operations, thus 
giving them the incentive to monitor management’s performance. 
The relationship between good corporate governance and transparency should 
thus be apparent. Corporate governance at its core involves the monitoring of 
the corporation’s performance and the monitor’s capacity to respond to poor 
performance – the ability to observe and the ability to act (Gilson, 2000). 
Transparency goes directly to the equity market’s ability to observe a 
corporation’s performance. Most information concerning a corporation’s 
performance is uniquely available from the corporation. Financial accounting 
information is the product of corporate accounting and external reporting 
systems that measure and routinely disclose audited, quantitative data 
concerning the financial position and performance of publicly held firms. Audited 
balance sheets, income statements, and cash-flow statements, along with 
supporting disclosures, form the foundation of the firm-specific information set 
available to investors and regulators (Bushman and Smith, 2003).  Financial 
accounting systems thus provide direct input to corporate control mechanisms 
by contributing to the information contained in share prices. Without effective 
disclosure of financial performance, existing equity investors cannot evaluate 
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management’s past performance, and prospective investors cannot forecast the 
corporation’s future cash flow. Equity investment requires good corporate 
governance, and good corporate governance requires the capacity to make 
credible disclosure of financial results. In the absence of effective financial 
disclosure, a country’s capacity to support equity markets and, in turn, important 
kinds of industry, is compromised.  
 
Effective corporate governance also requires a second form of transparency – 
ownership transparency. Just as shareholders can suffer from poor corporate 
performance they also can suffer from a controlling shareholder’s divergence of 
earnings or opportunities to itself (Gilson, 2000). For this reason, it is also 
important that companies disclose the identity of shareholders who own 
significant amounts of shares. Arguably, disclosure alone is insufficient to police 
self dealing by controlling shareholders. However, as a rapidly growing empirical 
literature demonstrates, effective substantive protection of minority shareholders 
is also critical to effective corporate governance and a successful equity market, 
but knowledge of whether the potential exists is a necessary first step. 
 
4.4 The Transparency Scorecard 
 
One of the major limitations of studies on corporate transparency is the difficulty 
in measuring the extent of disclosure. Researchers use several proxies for this 
variable, including management forecasts (for example, Miller and Piotroski, 
2000), metrics based on some analysts’ database (for example, Lang and 
Ludholm, 1993; Healy et al: 1999), and self-constructed measures (for example, 
Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Pham et al., 2004). However, 
Healy and Palepu (2001) maintain that each approach has its limitations. They 
posit that the use of management forecasts yields the advantage that they can 
be precisely measured and the timing of the disclosure is typically known. It is 
therefore possible to assess whether the forecast preceded or lagged particular 
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changes in variables, enabling researchers to conduct more powerful tests .The 
limitation, however, is that the accuracy of management forecasts can only be 
verified ex post by outside investors through actual earnings realizations. It is 
more difficult to ex post verify the accuracy of many other types of voluntary 
disclosure however, for example board processes. Therefore, research using 
management forecasts as the metric for disclosure is likely to increase the 
power of the tests, but the findings may not generalize to other forms of 
disclosure.  Healy and Palepu (2001) postulate that studies with self-constructed 
measures of disclosure face a different set of problems. They argue that 
because the authors have developed their own proxy, there is increased 
confidence that the measure truly captures what it is intended. However, to the 
extent that construction of the metric involves judgment on the part of the 
researchers, the findings may be difficult to replicate.  
 
Professional analysts have been argued to be one of the most important groups 
making assessments of the financial future of companies, thus are considered a 
good source of data to measure transparency (e,g, Brian and Rozeff, 1978; Lys 
and Sohn, 1990). According to Healy and Palepu (2001) analysts’ databases 
provide a more general measure of disclosure. Although it is unclear what 
biases the analysts may bring to the ratings they are likely to be particularly well 
qualified to judge companies’ corporate disclosure. Consequently, this study 
uses one such analyst’s benchmark to assess corporate transparency in 
Zimbabwe.  
 
The Standard and Poor Transparency and Disclosure benchmark has been 
chosen because of its appropriateness to this study. It provides the required link 
between transparency, corporate governance, and financial information by 
encompassing three broad categories; ownership structure and investor rights, 
financial transparency, and board structure and processes (Patel and Dallas, 
2002). The methodology, with ninety-eight questions in the three categories and 
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twelve sub-categories, is designed to balance the range of issues analysed and 
the tractability of the analysis. Its breadth and flexibility allow it to be applied to 
any country, thus allows for global comparisons. The Standard and Poor 
transparency benchmark has been proved transparent and objective.  It is well 
documented and publicly available, thus is easily verifiable. 
 
Out of the ninety-eight questions, eight were removed from this study, as they 
are not applicable to the Zimbabwean reporting regime. For example, for the 
most part Zimbabwean accounting standards are wholesale adoptions of 
International Accounting Standards, therefore it is not necessary for companies 
to provide accounts in alternate internationally recognised methods and 
reconcile the two. Thus, the final transparency scorecard has ninety information 
items, thirty of which are legally mandated by the Zimbabwe Companies Act, the 
ZSE listing requirements, and accounting standards, while the rest is voluntary. 
A difficulty arose in handling items thought to be “not applicable” for a particular 
company. Coding genuinely “non applicable” items as zeros would bias a 
company’s transparency score downwards, thus these items were removed from 
the total score of that company. As a result, transparency is assessed using a 
relative score, which is a ratio of the actual score to the total possible score per 
sample company. 
 
The scorecard is scored using an unweighted dichotomous scale. This approach 
assumes that each item of information disclosed is of equal importance in the 
decision-making process of information users (Chau and Gray, 2002). The use 
of an unweighted dichotomous scale has been used, and supported, in prior 
empirical studies (for example; Hossain et al, 1994; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; 
Chen and Jaggi, 2000). Ahmed and Courtis (1999) posit that the approach 
based on unweighted items has become the norm in annual report studies. The 
assigning of weights to each information attribute is not employed, as this would 
introduce a degree of subjectivity to the analysis. Moreover, prior empirical 
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research indicates both methods are generally interchangeable as they produce 
the same results (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Marston and Shrives, 1996).  
 
4.5 Hypothesis Testing 
 
Normality tests were carried on the dependent variable and results reported in 
the next chapter show that the data was taken from a normally distributed 
population; therefore parametric statistical tests were employed to test the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. Pearson’ product momentum correlations 
are used to assess the strength of the relationship between the corporate 
governance, and company specific, attributes and the transparency scores. 
Although correlations are a useful analytical tool, they are concerned with the 
covariability of variables, therefore do not prove causality between the variables 
involved. Correlation analysis does not suggest that variations in the 
transparency scores are caused by variations in, say, concentrated ownership or 
vice versa.  It is thus used as a suggestive and preparatory tool to give some 
clues to what the data might yield; to be followed by more sophisticated 
techniques (Barrow, 2002). Consequently, an ordinary least squares multivariate 
regression model is developed to ascertain the corporate governance and 
company-specific attributes that explain, in a conjunctive manner, the 
transparency levels of the sample companies.  
The use of ordinary least squares multiple regression approach is consistent 
with similar prior studies (for example; Hossain et al, 1994; Ahmed and Nicholls, 
1994; Chen and Jaggi, 2000, Owusu-Ansah 1998, Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
Multiple regression analysis enables the investigation of the collective influence 
of several independent variables on a single dependent variable. In the context 
of this study, it allows for investigation of the collective influence of both the 
corporate governance and company-specific variables on the transparency 
scores. A third reason for using a multiple regression is the influence of each 
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variable upon the dependent variable is measured, and its significance 
ascertained. Fourth, it allows the combination of different variables, with differing 
measurement scales, into one model. Finally, the use of multiple regression 
analysis does not deny the existence of other factors that might influence 
transparency; rather, it merely estimates the proportion of the transparency 
score that can be explained by the identified variables. Thus, the following linear 
model is assumed to hold for the sample companies: 
 
Transcr= βo+β1Cntrli+β2Auditi+β3Xdiri+β4FrnOwni+β5Sizei+β6Levrgi+β7Prfti+ei 
Where: 
Transcr  = the relative observed value of the dependent value (the      
transparency score) for the i sample company. 
βo   = the intercept to be estimated from the data which is assumed 
constant across the sample companies 
β1  = the coefficients of the independent variables to be estimated 
from the data, where i = 1…7 
Cntrli    = the ownership concentration variable for the i sample company. 
Auditi   = the audit committee variable for the i sample company 
Xdiri   = the cross directorship variable for the i sample company 
FrnOwni   = the foreign ownership variable for the i sample company  
Sizei   =the company size variable for the i sample company 
Levrgi    = the leverage variable for the i sample company 
Prfti   = the profitability variable for the i sample company 
ei   = residual term 
 
The table below summarises the operationalisation of the independent variables 
in the model: 
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Table 3: Summary of the Operationalisation of Independent Variables 
 
Independent Variable  Operationalisation 
Model 
Notation 
     
Corporate Governance Characteristics:   
I. Ownership Concentration 
Existence of a controlling shareholder, defined as a 
single shareholder owning at least 50% of 
shareholding  Cntrli  
II. Cross-Directorship 
Ratio of directors on the board with directorships in 
other companies to total number of directors Xdiri 
III. Audit Committee Composition 
Ratio of non-executive directors on the audit 
committee Auditi 
IV. Foreign Ownership 
Ratio of total shares owned by foreigners to total 
number of shares issued FrnOwni 
Corporate Characteristics:    
V. Company Size i) Log of total assets as at 2003 financial year-end Sizei  
  
ii) Log of total turnover for the financial year ending in 
2003  
VI. Leverage Debt ratio defined as total debt to total assets Levrgi   
VII. Profitability 
Return on equity defined as net income to total 
owners’ equity Prfti 
 
 
Natural logarithms were used for the company size proxies of total assets and 
turnover in order to standardise the data. Natural logarithms have been used in 
prior studies such as Owusu-Ansah, 1998. 
 
4.6 Summary 
 
This chapter described and analysed the processes by which empirical evidence 
on the transparency levels of Zimbabwean companies has been collected and 
analysed. Data from the final sample consisting of 39 ZSE listed companies as 
at the end of the 2003 financial year will be subjected to statistical tests such as 
 51 
correlation in order to test the association between seven variables and 
corporate transparency levels. Ordinary Least Squares multiple regression 
model was built with the seven variables of ownership concentration, audit 
committee, cross directorships, foreign ownership, company size, leverage, and 
profitability in order to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. The results 
of these tests are presented in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the findings, analysis, and discussion of the results of the 
statistical analyses are presented. First, a descriptive analysis of the data is 
made in order to establish measures of central tendency and dispersion. Section 
5.3 deals with the strength of relationships between the variables, while section 
5.4 is concerned with establishing the predictive power of the regression model. 
A section follows this on model diagnostics to test the reliability of the statistical 
model. This chapter is expected to develop conclusions regarding the 
relationship between selected variables and transparency. While correlations 
examine the extent to which variables are related, regression analysis will 
determine their predictive power, thereby testing the hypotheses developed. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are presented in table 4. The transparency scores for the 
sample companies in the study range from a minimum of 26% to a maximum of 
66%, with a mean of 52%. Although quite low, these scores are comparable to 
the transparency scores of other emerging economies. In their study of 
transparency and disclosure in 19 emerging markets, Standard and Poor find 
the mean scores of their sample companies to range from 22% to 55%, with 
varying means across the countries (Patel et al, 2002). They report South 
African companies as having the highest mean score of 55%, followed by Asia 
at 43%, Europe and the Middle East with 36%, and Latin American companies 
have a mean score of 29%.  In comparison therefore, the Zimbabwean 
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companies in this sample demonstrate relatively high levels of transparency.  
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
  Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
       
TRANSCR 0.29 0.66 0.52 0.07 -0.76 2.836 
CNTRL 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.49 0.49 -1.854 
XDIR 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.25 0.64 0.172 
AUDIT 0.00 1.00 0.73 0.30 -1.02 0.457 
ASSETS 
    
1,345.00  
     
293,424.00  
   
52,705.97  
        
77,953.05  2.23 4.069 
TNVR 
       
707.00  
     
174,526.00  
   
37,780.67  
        
36,542.54  1.78 4.019 
LEV 0.02 0.73 0.32 0.16 0.29 -0.155 
PRFT 0.06 3.06 0.60 0.49 3.38 17.056 
FRNOWN 0.00 0.77 0.15 0.23 1.39 0.654 
 The Variables in the table are defined thus: 
TRANSCR Transparency Score 
CNTRL Ownership Concentration 
Existence of a controlling shareholder, defined as a 
single shareholder owning at least 50% of 
shareholding  
XDIR Cross-Directorship 
Ratio of directors on the board with directorships in 
other companies to total number of directors 
AUDIT Audit Committee Composition 
Ratio of non-executive directors on the audit 
committee 
FRNOWN Foreign Ownership 
Ratio of total shares owned by foreigners to total 
number of shares issued 
ASSETS Company Size (total assets) i) Log of total assets as at 2003 financial year-end 
TNVR Company Size (total turnover) 
ii) Log of total turnover for the financial year ending in 
2003 
LEV Leverage Debt ratio defined as total debt to total assets 
PRFT Profitability 
Return on equity defined as net income to total 
owners’ equity 
 
The frequency distribution tabulated below shows variability in the extent of 
transparency scores among the sampled companies. About 64% of the 
companies in the sample disclosed between 25% and 75% of the items in the 
transparency scorecard, while about 36% disclosed between 50% and 75%. No 
company’s transparency scores fell in either the lower or upper quartiles. This 
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distribution of scores is similar to the results in the Standard and Poor study. Out 
of the 354 companies in the sample, about 74% disclosed between 50% and 
75% of the items, while 25% disclosed less than 50%, and only one South 
African company disclosed more than 75% of the items in the scorecard.  
Table 5 (a): Frequency Distribution of Transparency scores 
Overall Transparency Score (%) No. Of Companies  Proportion of Sample  (%)
75 and above 0 0.00 
Between 50 and 75 25 64.10 
Between 25 and 50 14 35.90 
Less than 25 0 0.00 
     
  39 100.00 
 
When the transparency scores are disaggregated into the three categories of; 
ownership structure, financial transparency, and board structure, an interesting 
pattern emerges. Ninety-five percent of the companies disclose at least 50% of 
the financial transparency items, while 74% disclose more than 50% of the 
ownership structure items, and only 10% disclose at least half of the board 
structure items. Again, the same pattern is found in the Standard and Poor 
study, where Patel et al (2001) state that the principal similarity across the 
regions is that disclosure of financial information is consistently higher than that 
of ownership, or board, structure. The financial transparency scores range from 
a minimum of 41% to a maximum 79%, with a mean of 36%. It may be argued 
that these relatively higher scores result from the regulation of financial 
disclosures, whereas ownership and board structure disclosures are largely 
voluntary. For example, there are no provisions in the Zimbabwean Companies 
Act regarding the disclosure of substantial shareholders who own more than a 
specific percentage of the share capital of the company, no stipulation on the 
number of non-executive directors, and details of executive compensation are 
only required to be disclosed in a company’s prospectus upon flotation. 
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Table 5 (b): Frequency Distribution of Disaggregated Transparency Scores  
Transparency Score 
Quartiles (%) 
Financial 
Transparency and 
Information  (%) 
Ownership Structure 
and Investor Rights  
(%) 
Board Process 
and Structure  
(%) 
75 and above 5.10 0.00 0.00 
Between 50 and 75 89.80 74.4 10.30 
Between 25and 50 5.10 23.00 84.60 
Less than 25 0.00 2.60 5.10 
        
  100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Although higher than the other two categories, the financial transparency scores 
in this study are lower than those reported by Owusu-Ansah (1998) for his 1994 
Zimbabwean sample. He found that the sample companies disclosed between 
63% and 85%. One explanation for this apparent reduction in financial 
transparency may be that companies disclose less in times of economic crises. 
However, this contradicts with the findings of a longitudinal study of Malaysian 
transparency before and after the Asian financial crises by Pham et al (2004). 
They find that levels of transparency significantly increased because companies 
improved their corporate governance in response to the crisis. Another possible 
explanation for the difference may be the role that management discretion plays 
in companies’ disclosure practices. One might argue that Owusu-Ansah found 
higher levels of disclosure in his sample because his disclosure index is based 
on mandatory disclosure requirements. Thus, as this study focuses on both 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure, the reduction may be construed to mean 
the managers of the sample companies exercised considerable discretion 
regarding what was disclosed in the 2003 annual reports. Finally, it may be that 
compliance levels have reduced between 1998 and 2003 due to less stringent 
enforcement efforts by the regulatory authorities as investor protection and 
property right laws are documented to have become almost non-existent in 
Zimbabwe in the past four years (for example, Magaisa, 2004; Bloch, 2004; 
Robertson, 2003) 
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The least transparency scores are found in the board structure category, with a 
mean score of 40%. The results indicate a particular weakness in the disclosure 
of processes.  For example, none of the companies in the samples disclosed the 
procedures for board appointments, decisions on performance related executive 
compensation, or procedures for proposals at shareholders’ meetings. 
Interestingly, when Standard and Poor carried out a similar study on British, 
Japanese, and American companies, they found similar results (Patel and 
Dallas, 2001). 
5.3 Correlation Analysis 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, correlation analysis seeks to assess the strength of 
the relationship between variables. It is generally argued that highly correlated 
variables should not be included in the same regression model. However, the 
problem lies in determining what constitutions a high correlation coefficient. For 
some, a high coefficient is anything above ±0.500; for others it is anything 
around ±0.600 (Eastman, 1984). However, a correlation coefficient less than 
±0.0800 is not considered to offer a serious threat to regression results (Farrar 
and Glauber, 1967 and Judge et al; 1985).  
The parametric Pearson product momentum test was employed to assess the 
strength of the bivariate relationships between the variables.  As shown by Table 
6 below, the three variables of ownership concentration, audit, and size are 
significantly correlated with transparency, with the audit variable showing quite a 
strong relationship, at 0.721 Pearson’s correlation coefficient. On the other 
hand, cross directorships, leverage, profitability, and foreign ownership are 
clearly not significant. It is interesting that the profitability variable is shown to 
have a negative, albeit non-significant, relationship with transparency, as this is 
contrary to theory and several prior studies. However, Owusu-Ansah (1998) also 
found mixed results for his 1994 Zimbabwean sample, with the Pearson product-
momentum correlation test showing a positive association with mandatory 
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disclosure, while a negative association was found with the Spearman rank-
order test. Both correlations were, however, not statistically significant. 
Table 6: Pearson’s Correlations 
 Transcr Cntrl Xdir Audit LogAss Logtnvr Levrg Prft FrnOwn
Transcr 1         
Cntrl -0.345* 1        
Xdir 0.087 0.197 1       
Audit 0.721** 0.037 0.082 1      
LogAss 0.370* 0.180 0.276* 0.416** 1     
Logtnvr 0.364* 0.207 0.127 0.427** 0.784** 1    
Levrg -0.111 0.178 -0.132 -0.002 0.110 0.259 1   
Prft -0.067 -0.056 -0.112 -0.001 -0.022 0.245 0.560** 1  
FrnOwn -0.140 0.262 -0.139 -0.231 0.029 0.089 0.248 0.170 1 
 
 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).    
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).    
 
As a preliminary approach to detecting the presence of multicollinearity, the 
correlation matrix is scanned for high correlation coefficients between 
independent variables. Except for log total assets and log total turnover, no 
other independent variables possess a correlation coefficient greater than 
±0.600. The two are highly correlated because they are both proxies for the 
same variable, company size. Field (2000) states that high levels of collinearity 
will increase the probability of a type II error, that is, a good predictor may be 
found non-significant and rejected from the model. Secondly, it limits the multiple 
regression coefficients, and makes it difficult to assess the individual importance 
of a predictor. Thus, two multiple regression models are run, each with only one 
of the company size variables. 
This collinearity detection procedure is commonly used in empirical studies, 
however, it has been criticised for missing more subtle forms of multicollinearity. 
Thus, further collinearity diagnostics are analysed in section 5.5. 
5.4 Multiple Regression Analysis 
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A multiple regression model was employed to establish the predictive power of 
the variables in this study, and test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3.  The 
variables used as predictors in this study have been selected using both past 
research and substantive theoretical importance. Because of the high 
multicollinearity between the two proxies for the company size variable, LogAss 
and Logtnvr, two different regression models were run, first with Logtnvr, then 
with LogAss. A third regression Model C, was run using the stepwise regression 
method in order to confirm the predictive power of the variables identified as 
significant by Models A and B. However, because this model gave the same 
results as A and B, its results will not be reported on. 
 
5.4.1 Model A 
Model A is a simple ordinary least squares regression model, regressing 
transparency scores against ownership concentration, audit committee, cross-
directorships, foreign ownership, size, leverage, and profitability. This model 
used the natural logarithm of turnover (LogTnvr) as a proxy for the company size 
variable. This variable needed to be transformed as it exhibited positive 
skewness. The results of this regression analysis are presented in table 7.  The 
F-statistic of 11.799 indicates that the model is highly significant. Overall, the 
independent variables selected in this study explain about 67% of the variation 
in the dependent variable (Transcr). Of the seven variables examined, two 
corporate governance variables of Cntrl and Audit are found to have a significant 
effect on transparency. The t statistics of the remaining variables are not 
significant at the 5% level, indicating a negligible effect on the transparency 
practices of Zimbabwean listed companies. 
Table 7: Model A Regression Results 
         
Source     SS df MS   F Sig. 
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Model residual total  0.125 7 0.018  11.799 0.000 
   0.047 31 0.002    
   0.172 38     
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-value Sig. 95% Confidence Interval Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 0.329 0.056 5.93 0.000 0.216 0.443   
Cntrl -0.479 0.014 -4.566 0.000 -0.093 -0.036 0.799 1.251 
Audit 0.695 0.024 6.361 0.000 0.105 0.204 0.738 1.355 
Xdir 0.108 0.027 1.082 0.288 -0.026 0.084 0.887 1.127 
FrnOwn 0.174 0.031 1.653 0.108 -0.012 0.113 0.793 1.261 
LogSize 0.177 0.006 1.56 0.129 -0.003 0.023 0.685 1.459 
Levrg -0.019 0.052 -0.157 0.876 -0.115 0.099 0.614 1.629 
Prft -0.144 0.016 -1.222 0.231 -0.052 0.013 0.638 1.569 
Mean VIF               1.379 
Number of observations 39      
R Square  0.727      
Adjusted R Square  0.665      
 
5.4.2 Model B 
This model uses the log of total assets (LogAss) as a proxy for company size, 
and regresses transparency (Transcr) against all the selected variables. The 
regression results are presented in table 8 below.                     
The explanatory power of the model is very similar to that of Model A, with a 
significant F statistic of 11.174, and an adjusted R Square statistic of 0.652. 
Consistent with the results from Model A above, the existence of a controlling 
shareholder, and the proportion of non-executive directors on the audit 
committee, are found to be significant predictors of the transparency practices of 
Zimbabwe Exchange listed companies. Thus, it can be inferred that company 
size has the same effect on a company’s transparency level, however it is 
measured. 
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Table 8: Model B Regression Results 
Source     SS df MS   F Sig. 
Model residual total  0.123 7 0.018  11.174 0.000 
   0.049 31 0.002    
   0.172 38     
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-value Sig. 95% Confidence Interval Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 0.364 0.047 7.676 0.000 0.267 0.461   
Cntrl -0.463 0.014 -4.357 0.000 -0.092 -0.033 0.812 1.231 
Audit 0.721 0.024 6.558 0.000 0.111 0.210 0.757 1.321 
Xdir 0.097 0.028 0.929 0.360 -0.032 0.084 0.833 1.200 
FrnOwn 0.179 0.031 1.662 0.107 -0.012 0.116 0.791 1.265 
LogSize 0.121 0.005 1.070 0.293 -0.005 0.017 0.720 1.388 
Levrg -0.016 0.054 -1.300 0.898 -0.117 0.103 0.609 1.642 
Prft -0.1 0.016 -0.844 0.405 -0.047 0.019 0.650 1.539 
Mean VIF               1.369 
Number of observations 39      
R Square  0.716      
Adjusted R Square  0.652      
 
Overall, the results of the two models show that, of the seven variables 
examined in this study, ownership concentration and audit committee 
composition are found to have a statistically significant impact on transparency 
levels. The most significant variable is the percentage of non-executive directors 
on the audit committee, implying that this corporate governance mechanism has 
a significant complementary impact on transparency. Ownership concentration 
has a significantly negative t statistic, thus plays a substitutive role. These 
results lend support to agency theory and substantiate the first and second 
hypotheses of this study. Variables found not to have a significant association 
with the sample companies’ transparency scores are: cross-directorships, 
foreign ownership, leverage, and profitability. Consequently, hypotheses H3, H4, 
H5 (a), H5 (b), H6 and H7 have been rejected at the 0.05 significance level. The 
results for each variable are discussed in detail in the following sections. As the 
results of both regression models are similar, the analysis of results will be 
based on the statistics from Model A. 
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5.5 Discussion of Results 
The existence of a controlling shareholder is clearly a major explanatory variable 
of transparency in Zimbabwean companies. The t statistic is negative and 
significant at the 0.05 confidence level. This implies that devices to separate 
corporate ownership rights from the control of corporate resources may serve to 
facilitate and camouflage self-dealing and related rent seeking behaviour in 
Zimbabwe thus, do not constitute a functional alternative to improved corporate 
governance and better protection of minority shareholders’ rights. Thus, agency 
theory, which holds that where there is separation of ownership and control 
shareholders press for more information disclosure for monitoring purposes, is 
supported and the first hypothesis of this study substantiated. The results of the 
Independent t-test lend further support to this. The results indicate a significant 
difference between the mean disclosure practices of companies with controlling 
shareholders, and those without. Having found no prior studies using the 
existence of a controlling shareholder as a proxy for ownership concentration 
comparisons are made with studies that have looked at the association between 
ownership concentration, per se, and disclosure. The negative association is 
consistent with previous empirical findings in other emerging economies, such 
as Firer and Williams (2003) for Singapore, Chau and Gray (2002) for Hong 
Kong and Singapore, Pham et al (2004) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) for 
Malaysia. However, this is in contradiction with the results found by Owusu-
Ansah (1998), and Hossain et al (1994). In a sample of 49 companies listed on 
the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange in 1994, Owusu-Ansah (1998) found a 
significant positive association to exist between ownership concentration and 
mandatory disclosure. The t statistic in his study was significant at the 10% 
level. It is suggested that this apparent contradiction arises from the differences 
in objects of study. Because this study is focused on both voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure practices, Zimbabwean companies with concentrated 
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ownership may choose to disclose less, perhaps to avoid losing control. 
The audit committee variable has been found to be positively associated with 
transparency scores in both regression models. The t statistic of 6.361 indicates 
strong evidence that the audit committee variable significantly contributes to 
corporate transparency, thus hypothesis H2 is supported. The β value suggests 
that a percentage change in the composition of the audit committee will change 
the transparency score by 0.695. It may be concluded from both these statistics 
that the composition of the audit committee has the strongest effect of all the 
variables, on the transparency practices of the Zimbabwean companies in this 
sample. This implies a high proportion of non-executive directors on 
Zimbabwean audit committees reduces the scope that management perceive for 
acting opportunistically and improves transparency, lending support to agency 
theory. Several studies have found similar results in other emerging economies, 
for example, Balachandran and Bliss (2004) in Malaysia, and Chen and Jaggi 
(2000) and Leung and Horwitz (2004) in Hong Kong, and Williams (2002) in 
Singapore. Eng and Mak (2003), on the other hand, found a negative significant 
association between the increased presence of outside directors and disclosure 
in Singaporean firms. This result suggests that Singaporean outside directors 
may be elected by block holders to represent their interests and thus acquire 
information directly from the company, rather than through public disclosure. 
Thus, the external directors tend to play a substitute-monitoring role to 
disclosure. Audit committees have been found in prior studies to be positively 
associated with disclosure practice. For example, Ho and Wong (2001) found a 
significant, positive relationship between audit committees and the voluntary 
disclosure practices of Hong Kong companies. On the other hand, a previous 
study by Forker (1992) had only found a weak, and non-significant relationship. 
The third corporate governance variable of cross-directorships was found to 
have a positive association with companies’ transparency scores. Although the 
direction of the relationship was as predicted, the t statistic for the regression 
 63 
coefficient is not significant at the 0.05 confidence level. Therefore, the third 
hypothesis is rejected. This is consistent with the only other study that has been 
found to test this hypothesis, Haniffa and Cooke (2002). Although they found a 
stronger association than in this study, the variable was not found to be a 
significant predictor of the disclosure behaviour of Malaysian companies. 
Although not significant, the positive association provides empirical evidence to 
the theory that when a director sits on more than one board, the company’s 
preference for confidentiality and restriction on information disclosure is 
deterred, thus the ‘individualistic’ nature of companies no longer holds as 
information is shared among the companies through their directors (Gray, 1988). 
Both tests of association, and tests of difference, were employed in order to test 
the hypothesis that companies with substantial foreign ownership are likely to 
have higher levels of transparency. As predicted, the results of the regression 
analysis suggest a positive association. Although the t statistic is not significant 
at the 0.05 level, it has a value (1.653) above the critical value for this sample 
size at the 0.10 confidence level (1.310). Therefore, these results provide weak 
support for the hypothesis that companies with some foreign ownership are 
likely to have higher levels of transparency. The Independent t-test for equality 
of means suggests no significant difference in the disclosure practices of 
companies with a substantial foreign shareholding (5%), and those that do not, 
however. The t value has a 1-tailed ρ value of 0.237. It can therefore be inferred 
that the presence of foreign investors has a negligible effect on the transparency 
levels of Zimbabwean companies. Although not significant at the 5% level, the 
positive association is consistent with Owusu-Ansah (1998), Ahmed and 
Nicholls (1994), and Haniffa and Cooke, (2002) who found a positive and 
significant association between foreign ownership/MNC affiliation and the 
disclosure practices of companies in Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, and Malaysia 
respectively. The positive relationship supports the argument that obtaining 
foreign funds means a greater need for transparency to monitor actions by 
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management. However, Soh (1996) and Hossain et al (1994) found a negative 
association. 
The hypothesis that the extent of the average company’s transparency score 
associates positively with the mean size of the companies in the sample was 
rejected. Although the positive association is consistent with agency theory and 
several other economic theories, the coefficients’ t statistic was not significant at 
the 0.05 confidence level. However, the results were similar for both models, 
suggesting that mean Zimbabwean company transparency levels associate 
positively with mean corporate size; however size is measured. Although the 
positive association is consistent with several other empirical studies, the finding 
of a non-significant relationship is not. As noted by Foster (1986), “the variable 
most consistently reported as significant in studies examining differences across 
firms in their disclosure policy is firm size” and this is supported by previous 
findings reported in literature, such as Buzby (1975), Chow and Wong-Boren 
(1987), Eng and Mak (2003), Jaggi and Low (2000), McNally et al. (1982), and 
Wallace et al (1994). Other studies have found similar results to this, however. 
Williams (2002) found company size not to have a statistically significant 
association with voluntary audit committee disclosures in Singapore, as did Tai 
et al (1990) in Hong Kong. Contrary to the results in this study, Owusu-Ansah 
(1998), found positive, statistically significant, correlations for his Zimbabwean 
sample. The different objects of study may explain these differing results. As 
Owusu-Ansah’s study focused on mandatory disclosure practices, it may be 
inferred that the management of the sample companies in this study exercised 
considerable discretion when it comes to voluntary disclosure. 
The regression coefficient for the leverage variable shows a negative 
association with transparency, with a t statistic which is not significant at the 5% 
confidence level. While the results do not support agency theory, or the 
hypothesis in this study, they are consistent with findings by Williams (2002) and 
Meek et al (1995). Meek et al (1995) in particular, found a negative, but 
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statistically significant correlation between leverage and voluntary disclosure 
practices of sample firms in the UK, the US, and continental Europe. These 
findings question the implications in agency theory and cast doubt on Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976) argument that more highly leveraged companies incur 
greater monitoring costs, thus will disclose more information in an effort to 
reduce these. Meek et al (1995) argue that agency theory may not offer a good 
explanation of disclosure, and the company size phenomenon noted above may 
be related to the costs of information production, proprietary cost, or political 
cost theories rather than agency costs. However, some empirical research 
shows significant positive association between leverage and disclosure, for 
example; Malone et al (1993) for a US sample and Chow and Wong-Boren 
(1994) for a Mexican sample. It is suggested that these inconclusive results may 
arise from differences in the definition, and therefore measurement, of the 
leverage variable. On the other hand, finance theory argues that low-geared 
companies are low-risk and, following signalling theory, may choose to disclose 
more to signal this good news. Low leverage, and the consequent low risk, may 
especially be viewed as good news in a highly volatile economic environment 
such as Zimbabwe’s, and may thus explain the negative correlation between 
leverage and transparency found in this study. On the other hand, the low t 
statistic indicates the probability that the negative sign may have occurred by 
chance. 
Contrary to expectation, the final corporate attribute of profitability is found to 
have a negative association with the transparency scores of the sample 
companies and the t statistic is not significant at the 0.05 confidence level, thus 
hypothesis H7 is rejected. Interestingly, Owusu-Ansah (1998) found mixed 
results in his 1994 Zimbabwean sample. Out of the four regression models that 
he ran, only one found profitability to be a significant predictor of companies’ 
mandatory disclosure practices, while it was not significant in the rest. While 
signalling theory suggests a positive association between disclosure and 
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profitability, there is an alternative school of thought. Labelle (2002) argues that 
a company with a less satisfactory performance might be tempted to improve 
the quality of its narrative statements in order to down play and justify the poor 
financial position, thus the direction of the association between profitability and 
transparency would be negative. Empirical evidence appears equally mixed.  
Cerf (1961), Singhvi and Desai (1971), and Haniffa and Cooke (2002), for 
example, provide empirical evidence of a positive association. On the other 
hand, Inchausti (1997), Meek et al. (1995), find no significant correlation 
between profitability and the level of disclosure in Spanish firms, and the US, 
UK, and continental European multinational corporations respectively, while 
Rutherford finds a negative association between performance and disclosure in 
a UK sample.  
5.5 Robustness Checks 
Several diagnostic tests were run in order to assess whether the regression 
model used in this study is a good fit of the observed data and can be 
generalised to the wider population of Zimbabwean companies. First, the 
possibility that certain cases might exert undue influence on the model 
parameters was investigated using standardised residuals and Cook’s distance 
statistic. Cook’s distance is a measure of the overall influence of a case on a 
model and Cook and Weisberg (1982) have suggested that values greater than 
1 are cause for concern. It is generally expected that ninety-five percent of 
cases would have standardised residuals within ±2 (Field, 2000; Barrow, 2002). 
From the thirty-nine cases in this sample, two (5%) have standardised residuals 
outside the ±2 limits, and Cook’s D statistics for these two cases are within the 
recommended threshold. Further, none of the DFBeta statistics for these two 
cases has an absolute value greater than 1, showing that they have no undue 
influence over the regression parameters. Thus from these diagnostics, the 
regression model appears reliable. 
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Table 9: Robustness Diagnostics 
Case 
Standardised 
Residuals TRANSCR Predicted Value Residual 
Cook's D 
Statistic 
Cairns Holdings 2.171 0.553 0.469 0.084 0.070 
Falcon Gold -2.059 0.289 0.369 -0.080 0.243 
            
a Dependent Variable: TRANSCR   
 
Second, the regression model assumptions were checked using econometric 
criterion. The first assumption has been satisfied as all the predictor variables, 
and the outcome variable of transparency score are quantitative. The non-zero 
variance assumption is difficult to verify and often taken for granted (Berry, 
1993). Similarly, it is assumed to hold in this study. The third assumption of 
independent errors holds that for any two observations the residual terms should 
be uncorrelated. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests for this autocorrelation 
phenomenon and a value close to 2, (2.096 is in this model), is generally 
accepted to mean the assumption of independent errors is tenable (Field, 2000).  
The results of two related procedures for testing the fourth assumption of no 
perfect multicollinearity, tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) are 
presented in tables 7 and 8 for both regression models, and reproduced below 
for Model A. Four guidelines are given in statistics literature for detecting 
multicollinearity using these procedures. First, Myers (1990) and Bowerman and 
O’Connell, (1990) suggest there is cause for concern when the largest VIF is 
greater than 10. Second, if the average VIF is substantially greater than 1 then 
the regression may be biased. Third, tolerance levels below 0.1 indicate a 
serious problem. Finally, tolerance below 0.2 may indicate a potential problem 
(Menard, 1995). The results in the table below indicate, based on the four 
criteria, multicollinearity is not a problem in this study. 
Table 10: Multicollinearity Diagnostics 
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Variable Tolerance VIF 
   
Cntrl 0.799 1.251 
Audit 0.738 1.355 
Xdir 0.887 1.127 
FrnOwn 0.793 1.261 
LogSize 0.685 1.459 
Levrg 0.614 1.629 
Prft 0.638 1.569 
Mean VIF   1.379 
 
5.6 Summary 
The results presented in this chapter suggest that corporate transparency levels 
of Zimbabwean businesses are weak. Further, the results of the regression 
models indicate that the variability in the transparency scores can best be 
explained in terms of a company’s ownership structure and the number of non-
executive directors on the audit committee. Of these predictor variables, audit 
committee composition is a very critical explanatory variable as it had a strong 
regression coefficient. Thus of the seven hypotheses developed in this study, 
hypotheses 3 to 7 were rejected. Robustness diagnostics indicate that the 
regression models employed are reliable and the results of this study can thus 
be generalized to the wider population of all Zimbabwean companies. 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains the summary and overall conclusions that have been 
drawn from this dissertation. It discusses the limitations of the research 
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methodology and statistical techniques employed on the data in an attempt to 
fulfil the two objectives set out in Chapter 1. Further, possible policy implications 
of the findings of this study are set out in section 6.2, while further areas for 
research are identified in section 6.3. 
6.2 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The objective of this study was twofold: (1) to assess the corporate transparency 
of Zimbabwean businesses; and (2) empirically explain the variability in the 
transparency levels of the sample companies in terms of four corporate 
governance, and three company-specific attributes. The four corporate 
governance mechanisms in question were ownership concentration, audit 
committee composition, cross directorships, and foreign ownership. The 
company-specific attributes of company size, profitability, and leverage were 
also examined. In respect to the first objective, results lead to the conclusion 
that Zimbabwean publicly listed companies have low levels of transparency. The 
results provide support for the argument that companies in emerging economies 
are opaque. Although quite low, the mean score of 52% is comparable to the 
transparency scores of other emerging economies. In their study of 
transparency and disclosure in 19 emerging markets, Standard and Poor find 
the mean scores of their sample companies to range from 22% to 55%, with 
varying country means from 29% for Latin America to 55% in South Africa (Patel 
et al, 2002).  However, a disaggregating of the scores of the sample companies 
on the basis of the three broad categories of financial transparency, board 
structure, and ownership structure, indicate that low transparency scores are 
found in the corporate governance categories of board and ownership structure, 
while financial information disclosures are relatively high.   
Although the reported results are based on a sample of 39 public listed 
companies, the results can be generalised to all other ZSE listed companies and 
the wider population of all public companies in Zimbabwe. One important policy 
implication arising from these results relates to the public policy concerning the 
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need to regulate corporate governance disclosures. Opponents of disclosure 
regulation suggest that mandatory requirements will lead companies to a ‘box-
ticking’ approach and limit the disclosure of useful information to stakeholders. 
However, while in fully developed capital markets private intermediaries may 
support non-legal incentives to make accurate disclosure, in capital markets with 
less fully evolved private institutions such as Zimbabwe, legal mandate may be 
necessary to allow honest companies credibly to distinguish themselves from 
dishonest companies (Gilson, 2000).  
 
It must be emphasised, however, that mandatory disclosure is no more effective 
than a company’s expectation that the rules will be enforced. There is evidence 
from this study that disclosure regulatory enforcement in Zimbabwe may not be 
stringent. Although the category of financial transparency yielded the highest 
score in this study, the mean score was still only 61% despite the high ratio of 
mandatory to voluntary disclosure items in the category. These results also have 
implications for the audit profession in Zimbabwe. Although the majority of 
Zimbabwean companies are audited by the ‘big 5’ auditing firms, the findings 
suggest that these auditors need to be more independent and vigilant in their 
audits and opinions in order to ensure compliance with regulations. The policy 
makers in Zimbabwe appear cognizant of the need for stringent monitoring 
however. The ZSE has recently reported that plans to set up a monitoring panel 
that would review all publications by listed companies are at an advanced stage 
(Dube, 2004). The ZSE chief executive stated that the purpose of this panel 
would be to ensure that listed companies published correct information and that 
listed companies were transparent in their conduct. 
 
The second conclusion relates to the statistical results of the multiple regression 
analysis to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. The results indicate that 
the variability in the transparency scores can best be explained in terms of a 
company’s ownership structure and the number of non-executive directors on 
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the audit committee. Of these predictor variables, audit committee composition 
is a very critical explanatory variable as it had a strong regression coefficient in 
both models. These results are consistent with agency theory and comparable 
to studies by Chau and Gray (2002) for Hong Kong and Singapore, Pham et al 
(2004) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) for Malaysia, and Williams (2002) in 
Singapore. As the diagnostics for the statistical model indicate that it can be 
generalised, these findings suggest that corporate governance mechanisms play 
a substantial role in the disclosure policies of Zimbabwean companies. Thus, 
transparency levels can be improved by making appropriate adjustments to 
companies’ corporate governance structures, namely board of directors and 
ownership structures. There is therefore scope for policy intervention through 
the encouragement of shareholder activism and strengthening minority 
protection to minimise rent-seeking behaviour by block holders, enhancing the 
governance of institutional investors, and encouraging disclosure of ownership 
and control to enhance the market for corporate control. The codification of a 
corporate governance manual that is uniquely Zimbabwean and suitable for the 
socio-economic environment of Zimbabwean companies may thus provide an 
alternative to regulation, while achieving similar results. Currently, ZSE listed 
companies are required to comply with either the King Report of South Africa, or 
the UK’s Combined Code. Companies such as Delta Corporation and Anglo 
American have devised their own in-house corporate governance manuals. 
 
The findings from this study have implications for company directors. A lack of 
transparency by a company with a majority of non-executive directors on the 
board, for example, may be construed by potential investors as a deliberate 
failing to provide greater transparency when the board has both the incentive 
and ability to do so. In the long term, stakeholders may lose confidence in the 
corporate accountability of the company, affecting the reputation of the directors 
and, consequently, the value of the company. Results indicate that about 88% of 
the companies in the sample have a majority of non-executive directors on the 
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audit committees; thus this risk may be aggregated to the Zimbabwean 
economy as a whole and have negative consequences for investor confidence 
in the accountability of Zimbabwean companies, thereby affecting the 
economy’s development opportunities. 
 
An interesting result from this study was the lack of support for the hypothesis 
that company size has a positive impact on transparency levels. This is contrary 
to theory and several empirical studies (for example; Buzby, 1975; Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Eng and Mak, 2003; Jaggi and Low, 2000; and Wallace et 
al, 1994). This may indicate that company size is not a significant factor in 
Zimbabwean companies’ disclosure policies. However, as an earlier study on 
ZSE companies found company size to be significantly positively related to 
mandatory disclosure practices, it may be inferred from this study that larger 
companies’ management exercise considerable discretion in the disclosure of 
voluntary information. Other variables found not to have a significant association 
with disclosure are: cross-directorships, foreign ownership, leverage, and 
profitability. 
 
6.3 Limitations and Further Research 
 
The conclusions drawn from this study should be considered in light of the 
following potential limitations. First, the use of the transparency scorecard 
means that this study does not assess the quality of corporate transparency. 
Thus, it suffers from the conceptual limitation that high levels of transparency 
are better than low levels. It has been analytically demonstrated that more 
information is not necessarily better, however. For example, literature on 
information economics has documented instances where more disclosure is 
Pareto inferior to less disclosure (for example; Hirshleifer, 1971). High levels of 
transparency may also lead to information over-load, more so in an emerging 
economy where a greater proportion of corporate annual report users are 
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unsophisticated (for example; Jagetia and Nwadike, 1983). As pointed out by 
Healy and Palepu (2001), experts' ratings are a noisy measure of transparency 
and consequently, may limit the power of the tests. This is exacerbated by the 
less formal aspects of corporate governance practices, which are more difficult 
to measure and may be more sensitive to changes in incentives to disclose. 
Thus, future research may examine Zimbabwean managers’ motives to make 
corporate governance disclosures.   
 
Second, corporate transparency has been assessed in terms of information 
disclosed in the corporate annual reports and accounts. Although this may 
encompass the institutional infrastructures of mandatory disclosure, accounting 
standards and, to some extent, the audit profession, corporate transparency 
encompasses the joint output of a multi-faceted system whose components 
collectively produce, gather, validate, and disseminate information to market 
participants outside the firm. It is thus a broad concept that is affected by, and 
should be assessed in terms of, other country-level discretionary factors. 
Moreover, companies use other disclosure media such as interim reports, 
prospectuses, and analysts’ conferences to disseminate corporate information. 
The annual report is assumed to serve as a good proxy for other media, 
however, and Lang and Ludholm (1993) have found corporate annual report 
disclosures to positively correlate with disclosures provided in these media. 
Further, the annual report is the major source of official, regulated corporate 
information in Zimbabwe (Oppong, 1993). 
 
Third, the study is cross-sectional in nature, thus the conclusions drawn relate to 
the transparency levels of the sample companies for the 2003 financial year. As 
regulatory environments change in response to local and international pressure, 
a longitudinal study would provide a more complete picture of the corporate 
transparency in Zimbabwean businesses. Fourth, the resulting model explained 
about 67% of the variability in corporate transparency, there is therefore a 
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possibility of omitted variables from the regression model. Due to data 
unavailability, some factors that have been found to explain the variability in 
corporate transparency such as company age and group affiliation have not 
been examined in this study. The high explanatory power of the model would, 
however, suggest that most of the significant variables have been captured in 
the model. Finally, the study is based on a sample of 39 ZSE listed companies. 
Although the robustness checks on the regression model suggest that the 
results can be generalised, replication of this study with a larger number of 
companies in other countries may assist in establishing whether the results 
reported are supported, and enable global comparison.  
 
Notwithstanding the above limitations however, the present study contributes to 
extant literature. First, the study provides unique evidence of transparency levels 
amongst publicly listed companies in Zimbabwe. It extends current literature on 
Zimbabwean corporate reporting by examining both voluntary and mandatory 
financial and corporate governance disclosures. Second, this study adds to the 
literature on companies’ corporate transparency practices in economic crises. 
Third, the explanatory power of the multiple regression model is sufficiently high 
to warrant an extension of the results to a larger sample size, and other African 
economies.  
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